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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
RAUL ROBERTO CARRILLO,

CaseNo.20060766-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from his conviction for manslaughter, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (West 2004), based on a bench verdict entered by
the Honorable Deno Himonas, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake City, Utah. This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue: If this Court reaches the merits, has defendant established that the trial court
clearly erred in finding that when defendant knowingly stabbed the victim, defendant was
aware of, but consciously disregarded, a substantial risk that death would result?
Standard of Review: In this case, the State maintains that the merits should not be
reached because (1) defendant failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings and verdict and (2) did not preserve the arguments he now raises or invited the

errors he alleges on appeal. See Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42, ^ 19
(marshaling); Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ^f 15 (preservation and invited error).
If the merits are considered, the trial court findings underlying a bench verdict'" shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given [by the appellate
court] to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.555 State
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1987) (quoting Utah R. Civil P. 52(a)). Accord In re
Z.D., 2006 UT 54, Iffl 31-33 & 40, 147 P.3d 401; State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah
1988).
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
A defendant commits manslaughter if he "recklessly causes the death of another.55
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(l)(a). A defendant acts "recklessly or maliciously55:
with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his
conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise
under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) (West 2004). SeeAddendumA for the complete text of these
and any other statutes or rules cited in argument.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 2004, defendant and his brother were charged with the murder of Daniel Johnson,
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West 2004) (R. 1-2). A
plea bargain was reached whereby defendant, who was already facing incarceration arising
2

from a probation violation and charges in another case, would plead guilty to third-degree
aggravated assault, if his brother plead guilty to second-degree felony manslaughter (R. 5666, 78-92). Guilty pleas to the amended charges were entered, but subsequently set aside
after the victim's family objected to the reduction (R. 39-40, 98-102, 104). The murder
charge was then reinstated (id).
On May 8, 2006, defendant and his brother waived their right to a jury trial and a
three-day bench trial commenced (R. 153-54, 167-70).

The trial court acquitted both

defendants of murder, but found defendant guilty of second-degree felony manslaughter (R.
169-70; R201: 262-66). See Addendum B (Trial Court's Oral Findings). On July 20, 2006,
defendant was sentenced to one-to-fifteen-years imprisonment, to run consecutively to the
other sentences he was then serving (R. 169-70). Defendant timely appealed (R.189).
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
The evening started out simply enough. Some friends asked eighteen-year-old Daniel
Johnson and his sixteen-year-old girlfriend Chelsea Stout to a party at the friends' apartment
on Windsor Circle (R201: 30, 112-13, 140; Exhibit 13). Others subsequently joined the

1

A sufficiency claim is fact-dependent and obligates an appellant to marshal the
evidence that supports the trial court's findings and verdict. See Martinez, 2007 UT 42, ^f
17 & n.3; In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54, ^ 39. As will discussed, infra at 18-25, defendant has
not met that obligation here.
The State recites the facts in the light most favorable to the findings and presents
conflicting evidence only "to the extent necessary to clarify the issue[] raised on appeal."
See ProMax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 250 n.l (Utah App.), cert
denied, 943 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997).

3

party, including defendant and his younger brother, Alexandra Carrillo (R201: 113-15).
Daniel and Chelsea did not know defendant or his brother prior to the party (R201: 145).
Over the next several hours, Daniel, Chelsea, and defendant drank brandy and/or beer
(R201: 116-18). Chelsea felt "buzzed," but not drunk (R201: 179-80). Defendant was "a
little bit drunk." See Addendum D (Police Interview of Defendant at 16). Chelsea and
Daniel also snorted a "line" of cocaine (R201: 120).2
At some point, Chelsea and defendant discussed body tattoos (R201: 117-18, 184).
Defendant showed her one of his tattoos, a "Joker" on his right forearm (R201: 46). He also
said she was pretty and asked why she was with Daniel (R201: 185). Chelsea later repeated
the comment to Daniel, but Daniel did nothing about it (R201: 185, 202).
In the early morning, a "really tipsy.. .Tongan guy" arrived at the party (R201: 121).
He knocked over some objects and was asked to leave (R201:122). He left but then returned
with five big male Islanders (R201: 123 &146). The Islanders pushed their way into the
living room. Chelsea confronted them: "Why do you guys want to come and start shit at
somebody else's house? Get out of here" (R201:123 & 147). One Islander threatened: "Get
out of my face or I will hit you" (R201: 147). Chelsea challenged, "Hit me," and the Islander
pushed her to the floor (R201: 123-24 & 148). Daniel fled out the front door (R201: 124&
148-49). Chelsea saw him leave, knew his car keys were in the bedroom, and walked down

2

At trial, Chelsea admitted that she had previously falsely denied using cocaine
(R201: 119-20, 176-77). She testified that "pretty much everyone" at the party used
cocaine, but she did not know if defendant had (R201: 117, 120).
4

the hall to retrieve them (id). Meanwhile, defendant and the others legitimately in the
apartment fought the invading Islanders (Add. D at 4-5, 7-8, 17-18).
Chelsea found Daniel's car keys and climbed out the back bedroom window (R201:
124, 128). She saw Daniel lying on top of a carport behind the apartment (R201:124,12829, 151). He shouted to her to get his car (id.). He jumped to the ground and got in the car
on the passenger side. Chelsea drove out the driveway (R201: 130).3
Just as Chelsea turned into the street in front of the apartment, Daniel realized he had
dropped his cell telephone in the driveway and asked Chelsea to get it (R201: 130). She
stopped the car and got out, closing the driver's door behind her (R201:130). When she was
approximately 7-12 feet from the car, she hear the car door open and looked back (R201:
131-32, 187-90). It was dark, but the car was illuminated by its interior dome light and a
nearby street light (R201: 180).
Daniel was now seated in the driver's seat with his legs outside the car (R201: 131,
152). Defendant was standing inside the open driver's door, leaning over Daniel, punching
him (R201: 132, 156). Chelsea saw defendant's brother walk over to the car and hand
something to defendant (R201: 132, 136, 156-57). She could not see what the object was

3

Chelsea testified that two women were in the bedroom, but stated they did not
follow her to the car (R201: 153-54). In earlier statements, she said the women got into
the car (R201: 200). Though defendant notes this and other inconsistencies in her
testimony, see Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt] at 4-5, the trial court found that these
peripheral inconsistencies did not undermine the credibility of Chelsea's eyewitness
account of the stabbing, which the court found "relatively consistent" (R201: 264). (Add.
B). Defendant does not challenge this finding on appeal.
5

until defendant flipped his hand and she saw the open blade of a blue butterfly knife (R201:
132, 137, 190-92). Without a word, defendant plunged the knife into Daniel's inner thigh,
about five inches above the knee (R201: 132, 137, 192).
Chelsea ran over and hit defendant (R201: 133). He yelled, "Get this bitch off me"
and hit her (R201: 133-34, 157, 159). She fell onto the street and was kicked by more than
one person until one of her ribs cracked and she blacked out (R201: 134, 158, 183-84).
At some point, the police were called (R201: 30).4
When the police arrived, Chelsea was conscious, but still in the street (R201: 134,
160-61). The police escorted her back into the apartment and questioned her about the fight
with the Islanders (R201: 62). Chelsea volunteered nothing about the stabbing, because she
was confused, scared, and believed Daniel was in the apartment (R201: 59, 161-64, 187).
In fact, Daniel had fled. After he was stabbed, Daniel drove to his mother's home,
about eight blocks from the Windsor apartment (R201: 31, 80). During the short drive, he
lost enough blood to create a pool one-quarter to one-half inch deep on the driver's side floor
and more blood on the front seat (R201: 86). When Daniel pulled into his mother's
driveway, he hit the side of her house with the car (R201: 81). He then fell or was pulled

4

Defendant asserts that a neighbor called the police at 4:59 a.m., citing only his
counsel's opening statement. See Br.Aplt. at 18-20 & 22-23 (citing R201: 19 & 22). He
makes other claims, citing to the preliminary hearing. See, e.g., Br.Aplt at 3, 5-8, & 1820 (citing R. 200), As will be discussed, a sufficiency claim is limited to the evidence
admitted at trial. See State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, % 14, 999 P.2d 1252.
6

onto the front lawn, where his brother attempted first aid (R201: 51,81, 89). Another pool
of blood formed under him on the grass. See Exhibits 10, 11 & 12.
At 5:07 a.m., the police were dispatched to Daniel's mother's home for what they
thought was an injury-accident (R201: 80-81, 86). Simultaneously, emergency medical
technicians [EMTs] were dispatched (R201: 82).
Police Officers Densley and Burnham found Daniel lying on the lawn with his brother
next to him (R201: 81-82). Densley looked inside the car and realized that something more
than a car accident had occurred. Burnham asked defendant what happened (R201: 86, 89).
Daniel replied, "A big Polynesian stabbed me" (R201: 90, 86).5
The officers did not provide additional first aid to Daniel because "medical was en
route" (R201: 82,89). "Just a couple of minutes" after the officers arrived, the EMTs arrived
and immediately treated Daniel (R201:83, 89). "Very quickly," not more than five minutes
later, they transported him to the hospital where the medical treatment continued (R201: 87,
97-98). Nevertheless, Daniel died (R201: 93).
The medical examiner concluded that Daniel bled to death from a stab wound in his
left leg (R201:94). The stab wound—most likely made by a single-edged knife blade—was
3 lA inches deep and slightly less than lA inch wide (R201:100-01). The blade struck and cut

5

Though defendant is not Polynesian, the trial court noted that even the Islanders
asked if he was (R201: 263; Add. D at 4). Despite this, defendant suggests that Daniel
was identifying someone else as the assailant. See Br.Aplt. at 8. However, the trial court
found that defendant truthfully confessed to being the assailant (R201: 263-64). On
appeal, defendant does not challenge this finding.
7

"a major branch of the femoral artery, which is the main artery which provides blood to the
leg" (R201:97).
The doctor explained, "Once an artery is cut, it will with every pulse of the heart,
every beat of the heart, continue to leak blood until it is either closed, sutured, tied off' (id).
If such an injury is untreated, the individual continues to lose blood and goes into shock
(R201: 97-98). Blood pressure may initially increase, but as blood loss continues, pressure
decreases. Organs—first peripheral and then central—begin to die as they are deprived of
oxygen, until finally the lungs, kidneys, liver, and brain fail (R201: 98). "As the brain
becomes starved of blood and oxygen it will begin to lose functions" and the injured
individual will have decreased intellectual ability and be unable to perform complex tasks
(R201: 99). Basic life-sustaining functions deteriorate and cease (id.).
In Daniel's case, the blade only partially severed the profunda femoris, a "significant"
artery and one of the two branches of the femoral artery, the main artery in the leg (R201:
101-02). A partial transection of an artery is "actually a little more dangerous of an injury
than a complete cut" (R201: 102). "Arteries are elastic, so they are under some degree of
tension. So if you cut it completely there is going to be a pulling back and somewhat of a
self-sealing of the artery. If you only cut it partially that pulling back and self-sealing cannot
occur, so it will bleed more copiously" (R201: 102). Here, the artery was "certainly cut
enough so that it was going to bleed" (R201: 103). Death would not be immediate, but
would evolve slowly over "at least" a number of minutes (R201: 105).

8

Because the wound Daniel received could not "self correct," medical intervention was
necessary to prevent death (R201: 105). In theory, the earlier adequate medical treatment
begins, the "greater the likelihood" of survival and, hypothetically, any delay in receiving
medical treatment contributes to the deterioration of the injured individual (R201: 105-06).
But the irreversibility of the damage largely depends on how rapidly blood is initially lost
(R201:105-06,110-11). Consequently, when blood loss is acute and quick, even "pouring"
blood and fluids back into the individual—as occurred here at the emergency room—will not
prevent death (R201: 97-98, 109).
After Chelsea learned that Daniel had died, she provided the police with a complete
account of what she witnessed (R201: 134,165, 169-71,173,195-99,205). She identified
defendant and his brother from a photo-spread and, though she was mistaken as to
defendant's first name, she also identified him by his "Joker" tattoo (R201:41 -46,55,71-73,
204-205).
Defendant and his brother were arrested. The brother refused to speak to the police,
but defendant waived his right to remain silent and was interviewed (R201: 33-36). The
interview was recorded, transcribed, and admitted into evidence.6 See Exhibit 1 (DVD
Recording of Police Interview) & Add. D (Transcript).

6

Defendant does not challenge the admissibility of his statements to the police.
9

Defendant described the fight inside the apartment as "crazy" and a "big old rumble"
(Add. D at 4 & 7). He was "swinging" so much that he likely hit his friends (Add. D at 7).
After a few minutes, the fight continued outside (Add. D at 4).
In discussing what happened outside, defendant initially claimed he did not have a
knife and did not stab anyone (Add. D at 10). He then admitted that he fought with Daniel,
but insisted that he could not "remember" having or using a knife (Add. D at 11,13, 15-1620). Yet, defendant would not say the eyewitness(es) were lying when they identified him
as the assailant: "Well if that's that then, if they seen me stab him then it was me that did it
±&T (Add. D at 12 Sell, 14).7
Defendant continued: "If I did stab him, you know what I am saying? If I did stab him
you know what I am saying I want to, I know it probably would have been an accident or
something. I honestly can't remember" (Add. D. at 13). Defendant acknowledged that the
police "got" him, but persisted that he had no memory of the stabbing (Add. D at 14-15). At
one point, the detective asked: "[W]hy didn't you just hit him with your fist [ijnstead of
stabbing him? (Add. D at 15). Defendant replied, "Honestly, I'm drawing a blank there"
(id.). Three questions later, the detective directly asked, "And you did stab him in the leg,
right," and defendant replied, "I guess I did" (id.).
Defendant said he did not intend to kill Daniel when he stabbed him (Add. D at 15).
He claimed that he was scared that night because he heard that, in general, Islanders like "to

7

The police told defendant there was more than one eyewitness (Add. D at 9).
10

shoot" and feared that these Islanders might be armed (Add. D at 15, 20-21). He said he
acted out of "self defense, you know, I [was] just trying to get out of there, just, I was scared
... Save myself, because I didn't know who was who or what was what I'm saying and that's
kind of, I don't know you know, I'm not trying to bullshit you, you guys got me for this, but
honestly I don't remember having the knife. All I remember is fighting" (Add. D at 15-16).
The detective asked if he was out of control, angry, or drunk (Add. D at 16). Defendant again
replied, "I was scared. There was a whole bunch of shit going on. I didn't know, I know
how those gangsters I know how gangsters are saying there's guns, everything, you know
what I am saying so I was [j]ust trying to get out of there as safe as possible" (id)}
Defendant explained that he was not denying that he stabbed Daniel, but that there
was "just so much commotion you know what I'm saying. I don't remember everything"
(Add. D at 19). He then detailed the fight with the Islanders inside the apartment. When he
exited the apartment, he walked passed Daniel, who was seated in the car (Add. D at 4,6,16,
18). Defendant claimed he did not recognize Daniel, though they had been together for
several hours. He thought Daniel might be one of the big Islanders who invaded the
apartment, yet described Daniel as "only 57" and "skinner" than defendant (Add. D at 5-6,
16, 18; R201: 146). Defendant walked over to the car after Daniel allegedly said

8

At trial, defendant did not claim that he acted in self-defense. His counsel argued
instead, that the fear defendant expressed supported the affirmative defense of extreme
emotional distress, which defense would reduce murder to second-degree felony
manslaughter, the crime of which defendant was convicted albeit under a different theory
(R201: 237-38). See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203(4) & 76-5-205(l)(b) (Add. A).
11

"something" to him (Add. D at 18). Defendant claimed that Daniel reached through the car
window and hit him (Add. D at 16,18, 24-26). Defendant admitted that he then opened the
car door and began punching Daniel (id.). Defendant alleged that Daniel kicked him (id.).
The detective asked if defendant stabbed Daniel to stop him from kicking him (Add.
D at 20). Defendant replied, "No, I was just trying to get out of there. No, I wasn't trying
to kill nobody. I'm not like that. Even in the house you know what I'm saying? I didn't
have no knife or nothing so I was just fighting" (Add. C at 20). The detective asked: "So
you're still saying that you didn't have a knife in the car?" (Add. D at 20). Defendant
conceded, "I guess I did have a knife," but then continued to vacillate (id.).
Defendant said fighting was a violation of his probation, but admitted that he liked to
fist fight (Add. D at 18, 20-21). But he distinguished between a knife fight and a fist fight:
If I had a knife, you know, if I stabbed him, [i]t wasn't intent. You know what
I am saying? I didn't mean for nobody dying, I didn't mean to stab nobody.
If I did stab people you know, I'm not that kind of person. I would like to
[fist] fight m o r e . . . .
I'm not like that, I'm more of a [fist] fighter you know. See my finger is
messed up from fighting? I've got scars from fighting. I love the fight. I'm
not a person to stab somebody or shoot somebody. I'm a man you know and
that's the way I like to go it. Knuckle up. And if I had a knife you know I'm
sorry for having the knife and I stabbed him I'm sorry for it. It wasn't intent.
(Add. D at 21-22). But ultimately, defendant fully confessed (Add. D at 22-25). Detective
Parks: We know you had a knife. Come on, you're nearly there for Christ sakes.
Defendant: And I'm trying to get the best way out of this that I can you know.
Parks: Ok, stop, you're nearly there. You had a knife right?
12

Defendant: I had a knife.
Parks: There you go. And you stabbed him in the leg, didn't you?
Defendant: I stabbed him in the leg.
Parks: Alright, and why did you do that?
Defendant: Probably to get him out of there so he'd stop hitting me, stop
getting the [b]est of me, you know what I'm saying?
Parks: Ok. And where was he sitting when you stabbed him with a knife?
Defendant: In his car.
Parks: Ok, now why is that so hard to say?
Defendant: It ain't.
(Add. D at 22). They further discussed what led up to the stabbing (Add. D at 22-23).
Parks: So he's sitting in his car and you're on foot and you exchange words?
Defendant: Yea.
Parks: And then you walk over and open the door and start fighting?
Defendant: No, I was on the driver's side, the driver's side and that's when
he said something and then he hit me and so I opened the door and started
hitting him back.
Parks: Did he start hitting you through the window or something?
Defendant: Yes.
Parks: What did he hit you with?
Defendant: His fist.

13

Parks: So then you opened the door and stabbed him, not meaning to kill him
but stabbed him? Not meanign [sic] to kill him.
Defendant: Yea. I'm not a murderer you know I like to fight.
Parks: What the hell you doing with a knife? What the hell were you doing?
Defendant: There was just so much commotion and confrontation going on I
was just trying to get out of there safe.
Parks: Were you in his way? I mean were you like standing in front of his car
so he couldn't turn and leave?
Defendant: Uh huh.
Parks: Then why would he exchange words with you?
Defendant: I don't know. I don't know. There was just so much shit going
on.
Detective Siebeneck: What did he say to you?
Defendant: He said like "who the fuck are you?" or "what the fuck do you
want?" or some shit like that. And I was like "what?"
Parks: So he called you on or something?
Defendant: Yea, he said something and I was like "what" as I was walking by
and I looked at him and he hit me.
Parks: That would make me angry too. So he said "who the fuck are you"?
Defendant: Yea, he said "who the fuck are you" or "what the fuck you want"?
Some shit like that.
Siebeneck: Just popping off?
Defendant: Yea, just popping off at the mouth you know and then when I got
up closer to him I was saying "well who the fuck are you" and everybody's
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adrenalin pumping seeing as we just got in a big old scuffle and so I was like
what the fuck and then I got hit and so I just started hitting him back.
Parks: So he hit you through his open drivers [sic] window?
Det Siebeneck: That's kind of chicken shit isn't it? Wouldn't even get out of
the car.
Defendant: It was kind of chicken shit for me to stab him too. It wasn't
something I intended or nothing.
(Add D at 23-25).
After defendant stabbed Daniel, he and his brother drove away from the apartment,
but then circled back (Add. D at 8). Defendant alleged that the police stopped him, but that
he said he was looking for a lost necklace (id.). He did not tell them that Daniel was injured
or needed first aid.
Before rendering the verdict, the trial court reviewed the DVD recording of
defendant's interview and "rereviewed it and then reviewed portions of it again" (R201:26364). Each time, the court became more convinced of the confession's truthfulness (id.). The
court also compared Chelsea's trial testimony with her earlier statements and found the two
inconsistent in many respects, but nevertheless credible and consistent regarding the stabbing
(R201: 208 & 264). The court also considered the nature of the stab wound (R201: 264).
The court found the evidence insufficient to establish murder and acquitted defendant
and his brother of that charge (R201: 264-265) (Add. B). The court then found that the
evidence established that defendant recklessly killed Daniel and convicted defendant of the
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lesser offense of manslaughter (id.). The court did not find defendant's brother guilty of any
offense (id.).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's admissions and confession establish that when he stabbed Daniel
Johnson, defendant was aware of, but consciously disregarded, a substantial risk that death
would result. Chelsea's eyewitness account and the wound itself also support that defendant
recklessly killed Daniel and is guilty of manslaughter.
On appeal, defendant does not challenge the trial court's reliance on the State's
evidence. Instead, he argues that, even when the State's evidence is believed, it is
insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, defendant contends that the evidence is
insufficient to establish that he was subjectively aware of, but consciously disregarded, a risk
that death would result (subjective intent). He further argues that the evidence does not
establish that a stab in the thigh creates a substantial risk of death (objective risk).
This Court need not reach the merits of defendant's sufficiency claim because he
failed to marshal the evidence supporting the challenged findings and verdict. Moreover, his
claims of errors are largely unpreserved or were invited by concessions he made below.
In the trial court, defense counsel admitted that if the State's evidence was believed,
it was legally sufficient to establish murder. In other words, that if believed, there was a
factual and legal basis to find that defendant, with the intent to cause serious bodily injury,
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life or; acting with depraved indifference to
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life, defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death. Defense counsel's admission
regarding murder necessarily was also a concession that the State's evidence, if believed, was
legally sufficient to establish murder's lesser included offense of manslaughter. This is
because proof of a higher offense necessarily includes proof of its lesser offense.
Consequently, defendant is now precluded from claiming for the first time on appeal that the
State's evidence is insufficient to establish the elements of reckless manslaughter, that is, that
he was subjectively aware of, but consciously disregarded a substantial risk that death would
result from the stabbing
Similarly, defendant waived his right to claim on appeal that he was unaware of a
substantial risk of death. In the trial court, the prosecutor argued that there was no factual
basis to find that defendant was unaware of the risk of death and, therefore, no basis for the
court to consider the lesser offense of negligent homicide. Defense counsel did not object
or claim there was a factual basis to find that he was unaware of the risk. Nor did he ask the
trial court to otherwise consider negligent homicide. Defense counsel's failure to assert this
claim below bars him from now claiming that the trial court clearly erred in not finding
negligent homicide.
Alternatively, if the merits of defendant's sufficiency claim are reached, the clear
weight of the evidence supports the trial court's findings that defendant recklessly caused
Daniel's death when he knowingly plunged a knife 3 Vi inches into Daniel's thigh and
partially cut a major artery. Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
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ARGUMENT
THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT
DEFENDANT RECKLESSLY KILLED THE VICTIM AND SUPPORTS
HIS MANSLAUGHTER CONVICTION.
In his police interview, defendant claimed he only liked to fist fight. He insisted that
he was not the type of person that would use a knife in a fight, because he had no intent to
kill. He characterized a person who uses a knife in a fight "a murderer." Yet, in the same
interview, he confessed that he stabbed Daniel Johnson with a knife, while Daniel was
unarmed and seated in a car. The trial court credited defendant's admissions and confession,
as well as the State's other evidence, found that defendant did not intentionally kill Daniel,
and acquitted him of murder. The court correctly found, however, that defendant recklessly
caused Daniel's death in that, when defendant knowingly stabbed Daniel, he was aware of,
but consciously disregarded, a substantial risk that death would result. Based on these
findings, the court properly convicted defendant of second-degree felony manslaughter, one
of the lesser included offenses defendant asked the trial court to consider.
On appeal, defendant does not challenge the trial court's reliance on the State's
evidence. Instead, he claims that even when the evidence is believed, it is insufficient to
establish reckless manslaughter. See Br.Aplt. at 18-25. This Court need not address the
substance of defendant's sufficiency challenge because he failed to marshal the evidence
supporting the trial court's findings and verdict. Additionally, defendant failed to preserve
the claims he now raises and invited the errors he alleges. Alternatively, if the substance of
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defendant's sufficiency claim is addressed, it lacks merit. Review of the record establishes
that the clear weight of the evidence, properly marshaled, supports the trial court's finding
that defendant recklessly killed Daniel
(A)

The Merits of Defendant's Sufficiency Challenge Should Not Be
Considered Because He Failed to Marshal the Evidence Supporting
the Trial Court's Findings and Verdict.

"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, [an appellate court] must
sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is 'against the clear weight of the evidence, or if
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.'" State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786 (Utah 1988) (quoting State v. Walker, 743
P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1987). See also In re Z.D., 2006UT 54,^31-33

&40,147P.3d401.

"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial judge
to judge the credibility of witnesses.'" Utah R. Civil P. 52(a) (Add. A). For it is the trial
court, not the appellate court, that "views first-hand witnesses' 'tells' of posture, inflection,
or mood that strengthen or erode credibility." In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54, <[{ 24. See also
Goodman, 763 P.2d at 787 (recognizing that an appellate court reviews "the record to see
if the clear weight of the evidence, not including demeanor and credibility, is contrary to the
verdict").
In determining if evidence sufficiently supports a bench verdict, an appellate court
must "distinguish between the situation in which [it] think[s] that if [it] had been the trier of
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fact [it] would have decided the case differently and the situation in which [it is] firmly
convinced that [it] would have done so." In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54, f 34 (citation and
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).

Moreover, the appellate court must

consider "the whole record, or at least that portion of the record to which its attention was
drawn by the appellant's marshaling obligation or the appellee's response to the appellant's
marshaled evidence." Id, at \ 39.
An appellant's marshaling obligation requires him to gather "all of the evidence
supporting the [the trial court's factual] findings and show that despite the supporting facts,
and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported [by
the clear weight of the evidence]." Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42, \ 17.
It demands more than simply rearguing favorable facts based on "selective excerpts of the
record." ProMax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah App.), cert
denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). Instead, an appellant must present "'in comprehensive
and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports
the very findings [he] resists.'" Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, \ 11, 100 P.3d 1177 (quoting
Neeley v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, Tf 11, 51 P.3d 724). After reconstructing the evidence
in full, the appellant must "then 'ferret out a fatal flaw'" that clearly proves the judgment
erroneous. ProMax, 943 P.2d at 255 (quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818
P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah 1991)).
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When an appellant fails to properly marshal the evidence, a reviewing court may
refuse to consider the merits of a claim.9 See Martinez, 2007 UT 41, \ 19.
Defendant's most flagrant marshaling failure is his refusal to fully acknowledge his
confession. Though the transcript of the police interview is 26 pages long, defendant
summarizes its contents in one paragraph in his Statement of Facts. Compare Br.Aplt. at 9,
with State's Statement of Facts at 9-15 & Add. D. In the "marshaled evidence" section of
his brief, see Br.Aplt. at 18-25, defendant never refers to the interview. Nor does he attach
a copy of the interview to the addenda of his brief. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(10) (requiring
parties to attach as addenda "those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance
to the determination of the appeal").
In defendant's one-paragraph summary of the police interview, he does not admit that
he confessed. He claims instead that he admitted once that he had a knife and once that he
stabbed Daniel, but only because the police suggested it, and that otherwise he consistently
denied having a knife or stabbing Daniel.

See Br.Aplt. at 9.

This is not a fair

characterization of the interview. See Statement ofFacts at 10-15 & Add. D. It also ignores
the trial court's contrary finding. See R201: 263-64 (Add. B).

9

Defendant suggests that his marshaling duty is lessen in this case because it is
easier to prove clear error when guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Br.Aplt. at 11-13 (citing In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54). The Utah Supreme Court recently
clarified that an appellant's marshaling obligation applies "regardless of the standard of
review at issue." Martinez, 2007 UT 42, ^ 17 n.3. See also United Park City Mines Co.
v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35,ffi[37-38, 140 P.3d 1200.
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When the evidence is properly marshaled, it establishes that when defendant was
interviewed, he initially denied using a knife. Defendant insisted that he was not the type of
person, "a murderer," who would use a knife in a fight. See Statement of Facts at 10-12. At
several points, he protested that he did not "remember" a knife or stabbing, but at the same
time, clarified that he was not denying that he may have stabbed Daniel. Id. Ultimately, he
folly confessed that h e stabbed Daniel, who was unarmed and seated in a car, and
characterized his actions as "chicken-shit" (id. at 12-15). See also Add. D.
In closing, defense counsel argued that the trial court should not credit his confession
because he simply repeated what the police suggested (R201: 225-30).10 The trial court
disagreed. It "reviewed and reviewed" the DVD of the confession and found that defendant
truthfully confessed (R201:263-64) (Add. B). Defendant does not acknowledge this finding.
In sum, defendant's failure to properly marshal the facts of his confession justifies
summary rejection of his sufficiency challenge. See Martinez, 2007 UT 42, ^f 19. But
defendant's marshaling failures extend further.
Defendant asserts numerous "facts," which he claims establish that the police
unreasonably delayed giving Daniel first aid and thereby created a substantial risk of death
that did not otherwise exist. See Br.Aplt. at 18-20. He states that a neighbor called the police
to the Windsor apartment at 4:59 a.m. See Br.Aplt. at 5 & 8 (citing R201: 19). He claims

10

Defense counsel argued this in closing, but never moved to suppress the
statements.
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that the EMTs arrived at 5:15 a.m. at Daniel's mother's home, some 16 minutes later. See
Br.Aplt. at 10 (citing R201:22). He represents that even though blood squirted from Daniel's
leg, the officers did not render first aid because they did not believe the injury was serious.
See Br.Aplt at 19-20 & 22 (citing R200: 45-51). To support these "facts," defendant relies
on his counsel's opening statement (R201: 19-22) or the preliminary hearing testimony of
Officer Burnham, who did not testify at trial (R200: 45-51). Defendant's reliance on these
sources is improper. Only evidence admitted at trial is properly considered in a sufficiency
claim.11 See State v. Larson, 2000 UT App 106, % 14, 999 P.2d 1252.
When the evidence is properly marshaled, it establishes that the police were
dispatched to the Windsor apartment sometime in the morning, but provides no other
information as to when the call was made or by whom (R201: 30, 134). The police were
dispatched to Daniel's mother home at 5:07 a.m., but the evidence does not establish when
the officers arrived (R201: 80-81, 86). The marshaled evidence establishes that Daniel's
brother attempted first aid and was next to Daniel when the police arrived, though it is
unclear if he was providing first aid when the police arrived (R201: 51, 81, 90). Officer
Densley explained that he did not render first aid because he "knew medical was on the way"
(R201: 83, 89). The EMTs arrived "just a couple of minutes" later and immediately began

11

A portion of the preliminary hearing transcript—Chelsea's testimony— was
reviewed by the court when it evaluated her credibility (R201: 208). But Officer
Bumham did not testify at trial and the court did not admit or consider his preliminary
hearing testimony. Yet, defendant presents Burnham's preliminary hearing testimony as
trial evidence.
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medical treatment (R201: 83). Not more than five minutes later, the EMTs transported
Daniel to the hospital, where medical treatment continued but was unsuccessful (R201: 87,
93, 97-98, 109).12
Defendant also does not marshal the evidence concerning the nature of the injury. He
calls a partial transection of an artery "unusual" and "very unique." Br.Aplt. at 10 & 24. He
then claims that, but for the uniqueness of this injury, a stab wound in the thigh creates no
substantial risk of death. Id Again, defendant is merely recasting his counsel's closing
argument as fact (R201: 235).
When the evidence is properly marshaled, it establishes that the medical examiner
never called Daniel's injury unique or unusual (R201: 92-111). The doctor testified that the
femoral artery runs through the leg and has two branches. When defendant stabbed Daniel,
the blade went 3 V? inches into the thigh and partially severed one of those branches (R201:
100-02). Once an artery is cut, whether partially or completely, it will bleed (R201:102-03).
But with a partial cut, a more acute loss of blood results (R201:102). Without intervention,
the bleeding will continue until death results (R201: 102-11). And though death is not

12

Even if Officer Burnham's preliminary hearing testimony constituted trial
evidence, as defendant suggests, it does not support defendant's assertions. In the
preliminary hearing, Burnham testified that he was unsure of the precise location of
Daniel's wound, but after he saw blood squirt out, told Daniel's brother to press down on
the spot until the EMTs arrived. Burnham explained that when he said this, he could hear
the EMTs' sirens approaching (R200: 45-46, 49-50).
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immediate, without intervention, it will result within minutes (id). Moreover, if the initial
loss of blood is acute, even medical intervention may not prevent death (id.).
Similarly, defendant asserts that the medical examiner "testified that the lack of
medical help from the time between when 911 was called until medical help arrived . . .
'would certainly have contributed to the deterioration in a person's condition'" and that "if
Daniel had received first aid it would have 'retarded the progression of his demise.'"
Br.Aplt. at 21. This does not fairly represent the substance of the doctor's testimony. As
previously explained, the marshaled evidence does not establish how much time elapsed
between the stabbing and the arrival of the officers at Daniel's mother's home; all that is
known is that two minutes after the police arrived, the EMTs arrived. See supra at 23-24.
The evidence establishes that before the police and EMTs arrived, Daniel had already lost
large amounts of blood—there was a pool of blood one-fourth to one-half inch thick on the
car floor, more on the car seat, and still more on the grass. See Statement of Facts at 6-7.
The medical examiner was not asked about the actual two minute delay between the
arrival of the police and the arrival of the EMTs. He was instead asked about hypothetical
delays of six minutes, 13 minutes, and 19 minutes—presumptively representing counsel's
speculation of the time gap between the stabbing and EMTs' arrival (R201:105 & 110). The
doctor responded that any delay in receiving medical attention would hypothetically impact
the person's chance of survival "ifno pressure, tourniquet, and other methodologies of trying
to slow down the bleeding had been applied" (R201: 105-06) (emphasis added). But, the
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doctor explained, the key factor affecting the irreversibility of the damage is the rate of the
blood loss. If the initial blood loss is acute, chances of survival—even with medical
treatment—are diminished (R201: 109-11). If the loss is slow and extends over time, the
person "may be able to survive" (R201: 109) (emphasis added). In this case, the blood loss
expected would be more copious, because the artery was partially severed, than if the artery
had been completely cut (R201: 102-03).
In sum, the marshaled evidence establishes that defendant fled eight blocks to safety
of his mother's house after being stabbed. At some point, Daniel's brother rendered some
first aid. The police did not render first aid because when they arrived, the EMTs were
already en route and arrived two minutes later. But by that point, Daniel had loss so much
blood that even medical intervention could not save him. These facts do not support
defendant's claim that Daniel likely would have lived, but for the officer's decision to wait
two minutes for the EMTs.
Defendant also does not set forth the trial court's full findings, in contravention of the
marshaling standard and rule 24(a)(l 1 (C), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. He attaches
no copy of the closing arguments, during which the trial court discussed its views of the
evidence, and attaches no copy of the trial court's oral findings. Instead, defendant states
only that the trial court found that defendant recklessly stabbed Daniel. See Br.Aplt. at 9-10.
As will be discussed in the next section, the court's findings go beyond this. Moreover,
contrary to defendant's assertion, see Br.Aplt. at 10, the trial court did not refuse defense

26

counsel's request to state what lesser included offenses it considered. On the contrary,
counsel withdrew this request once defendant was convicted only of a lesser included offense
(R201: 261 & 265-66).
(B)

The Merits of Defendant's Sufficiency Challenge Should Not Be
Considered Because He Failed to Preserve His Claims or Invited the
Errors He Alleges.

The merits of defendant's sufficiency challenge also should not be considered
because, in large part, he failed to preserve the arguments he now raises. Morever, defense
counsel's concessions and omissions below invited the errors he alleges on appeal.
"Generally, in order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to the
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue," Pratt
v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ^f 15 (citation and quotation marks omitted). "[T]he preservation
requirement is based on the premise that, in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court
ought to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it."
Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Consequently, "a party may not claim to have
preserved an issue for appeal by merely mentioning an issue without introducing supporting
evidence or relevant legal authority." Id. (ellipses omitted).
Closely tied to the preservation rule is the invited error doctrine, which precludes a
party from claiming error "when that party led the trial court into committing the error." Id.
at \ 17 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The doctrine recognizes that a party is "not
entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at trial and the benefit of objecting on appeal."
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Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). It is "designed to inhibit a defendant from
foregoing an objection with the strategy of enhancing the defendant's chances of acquittal
and then, if that strategy fails, claiming on appeal that the court should reverse." Id. at n. 18
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
As will be more folly discussed, defendant not only failed in large part to preserve his
arguments on appeal, but he also invited the errors he now alleges.
Defense counsel admitted in closing that the State's evidence, if believed, was
sufficient to establish murder. See discussion, infra. In other words, he admitted that there
was no legal bar to a finding of murder or any lesser included offense of murder, if the trial
court believed the State's evidence. But the invitation to find murder was conditioned upon
the trial court believing the State's evidence—and defense counsel argued that the evidence
was not worthy of belief. Moreover, counsel argued that even if the evidence was believed
and murder found, murder should be reduced to the lesser offense of manslaughter under an
extreme emotional distress theory. And when the prosecutor requested consideration of a
different theory of manslaughter—reckless manslaughter—defense counsel did not object.
Neither of the parties asked the trial court to consider the lesser offense of negligent
homicide, which required a factual basis to believe that defendant was unaware of the risk
attendant in stabbing a person with a knife. In sum, defense counsel told the trial court that,
if it believed the evidence, there was no legal bar to a finding of murder or manslaughter.
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The trial court found the State's evidence credible and convicted defendant of reckless
manslaughter.
On appeal, defendant no longer claims that the State's evidence is not believable. Nor
does he claim that the trial court erred in crediting it. Instead, he claims that even when the
State's evidence is believed, it is insufficient to establish reckless manslaughter. See Br.Aplt
at 18-25. He also now claims that a factual basis exists to support negligent homicide, i.e.,
that he was unaware of the risk of death. See id. As will be discussed, infra, the preservation
rule and the invited error doctrine preclude consideration of these claims. The significance
of defendant's concessions and omissions becomes apparent in the context of the offenses
charged and considered.
Murder
Defendant was charged with murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-203 (West 2004) (R. 1-2). He was not charged with the first variant of murder,
i.e., that he intentionally and knowingly killed Daniel. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2)(a)
(Add. A). Nevertheless, in rendering its verdict, the trial court found that the evidence was
insufficient to establish that defendant intended Daniel's death (R201: 265) (Add. B). That
finding is not at issue.
Defendant was charged with the second and third variants of murder (R. 1-2).
The second variant of murder is established when a defendant, "intending to cause
serious bodily injury to another , . . commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that
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causes the death of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2)(b) (Add A). "'Serious bodily
injury' means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted
loss or impairment of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death"
See Utah Code Ann. §76-1-601(10) (West 2004) (emphasis added) (Add A). An act clearly
dangerous to life is one that creates a "a very high risk of death." State v. Standiford, 769
P.2d 254, 259 (Utah 1988). Thus, to be guilty of the second variant of murder, a defendant
must intend to create a substantial risk of death and knowingly engage in conduct that creates
a very high risk of death. Id. Here, the trial court found the evidence insufficient to establish
the objective risk element, i.e., that stabbing a person in the thigh creates a very high risk of
death (R201: 254). The court did not find insufficient evidence of defendant's intent to do
serious bodily injury (id.).
The third variant of murder is established when a defendant, "acting under
circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life . . . engages in conduct that
creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby causes the death of another." See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2)(c) (Add. A). To be guilty of the third variant of murder, a
defendant must knowingly and with "utter callousness and indifference to human life" create
a risk that has a "highly likely probability" of causing death. See Standiford, 769 P.2d at
261-62 & 264. Here, the trial court found the evidence insufficient to establish defendant's
subjective callousness or the requisite objective risk (R201: 265).
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At trial, defense counsel's argument against murder was two-pronged. First, he
argued that the trial court should not credit either his confession or Chelsea's testimony and
that, without this evidence, there was no proof that he stabbed Daniel (R201:225-32 & 23 8).
See Addendum C (Closing Arguments). The trial court rej ected this argument when it found
the confession truthful and Chelsea's account credible (R201:263-64) (Add. B). On appeal,
defendant does not attack these findings or otherwise contest that he stabbed Daniel.
Defense counsel made an alternative argument against murder. He admitted that, if
the State's evidence was believed, it was legally sufficient to establish murder (R201: 22425) (Add. C). But he argued that any finding of murder should be reduced to second-degree
felony manslaughter (R201: 237-38).
Manslaughter
Defense counsel explained that murder should be reduced to manslaughter if the court
found, in addition to the element of murder, that defendant stabbed Daniel while acting under
the effect of extreme emotional distress (R201:237-38) (Add. C). "A person suffers extreme
emotional distress when exposed to extremely unusual and overwhelming stress such that the
average reasonable person would react by experiencing a loss of self-control." State v.
Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ^ 14, 116 P.3d 985 (citations omitted and quotation marks omitted).
Defendant argued that any doubt as to whether extreme emotional distress existed must be
resolved in defendant's favor (id.).

31

Extreme emotional distress manslaughter demands a predicate finding of murder. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1 )(b) (recognizing that this variant of manslaughter occurs when
a defendant "commits a homicide that would be murder, but the offense is reduced pursuant
to Subsection 76-5-203(4)" of the murder statute) (emphasis added). Subsection 203(4), in
turn, recognizes that it is "an affirmative defense to a charge of murder... that the defendant
caused the death of another . . . under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which
there is a reasonable explanation or excuse;" but the distress "substantially caused by the
defendant's own conduct" is excluded from justifiable distress. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5203(4)(a)(i) & -(b)(ii) {Add A).
The prosecutor claimed there was not sufficient evidence to support the defense and
objected to the court considering a reduction to manslaughter under this theory (R201:219)
(Add. C). See Spillers, 2007 UT 13, \ 19 (recognizing that while a defendant need not use
particular language or key words to raise the defense of extreme emotional distress, there
must be a "rational basis for a verdict on the lesser included offense" of manslaughter).
The prosecutor agreed, however, that manslaughter could appropriately be considered
as a lesser offense alternative under the theory that defendant recklessly caused Daniel's
death (id.). Reckless manslaughter requires that the defendant be aware of, but consciously
disregard, a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will result from his actions. See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-5-205(1) & 76-2-103(3) (West 2004) (Add A). See also State v. Dunn,
850 P.2d 1201, 1214 (Utah 1993).
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Defense counsel did not argue that the facts would not support a finding of reckless
manslaughter or otherwise obj ect to a finding of reckless manslaughter (R201:224-3 8) (Add
Q . Indeed, when the defense counsel subsequently listed the lesser included offenses it
wanted considered, he stated, "manslaughter," without differentiating between the two
supporting theories (R201: 246). Ultimately, the trial court accepted the parties' invitation
to consider the lesser included offense of manslaughter and found defendant guilty of
manslaughter under the reckless theory (R201: 265) (Add. B).
Defendant now claims, for the first time, that the trial court clearly erred in finding
manslaughter. His concessions and omissions below bar consideration of the claim.
When defendant admitted that the State's evidence, if believed, was legally sufficient
to establish murder, he conceded that the evidence was sufficient to find the subjective intent
element of murder, i.e., that defendant intended to create a high risk of death or knowingly
created a highly likely probability of death. See murder discussion, supra at 29-30.
Establishment of an intentional or knowing mental state necessarily establishes a reckless
mental state. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-104(2) (West 2004) (recognizing that a lower
mental state is proved by establishment of a higher mental state) (Add. A), See also Dunn,
850 P.2d at 1212. Thus, by conceding that the evidence, if believed, was legally sufficient
to establish murder's intentional or knowing mental state, defense counsel necessarily agreed
that the evidence was also legally sufficient to establish manslaughter's reckless mental state.
Consequently, any error in finding reckless manslaughter was invited. Defendant cannot now
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argue that the evidence is insufficient to establish a reckless intent, i.e., that defendant was
subjectively aware of, but consciously disregarded a substantial risk of death. See Pratt,
2007 UT 41, If 17 & 18.
Similarly, wThen defense counsel admitted that the evidence, if believed, established
murder, he conceded that the evidence was legally sufficient to prove the existence of
murder's objective risk element, i.e., that objectively a very high risk or highly likely
probability of death existed. See murder discussion, supra at 29-30. A very high or highly
likely risk of death is greater than a substantial risk of death, the objective risk element of
manslaughter. Standiford, 769 P.2d at 265-66. Consequently, by admitting that the
evidence, if believed, was sufficient to establish the objective risk element of murder,
defendant necessarily admitted that the evidence, if believed, was also sufficient to establish
the lower objective risk element of manslaughter. Again, whether viewed as waiver or
invited error, defendant is now precluded from arguing that the evidence does not establish
the existence of a substantial risk of death.13 See Pratt, 2007 UT 41, ^ 17 & 18.
Negligent Homicide: Defendant also waived consideration of his subjective intent
claim when he failed to ask the trial court to consider negligent homicide.

13

Defendant also asked the court to consider third-degree felony homicide by
assault, which applies only "under circumstances not amounting to . . . murder or
manslaughter:' Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-209 (West 2004) (emphasis added) {Add A). The
trial court's manslaughter finding precluded consideration of this lesser offense. On
appeal, defendant does not argue that the evidence establishes homicide by assault.
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As discussed, supra, at 32, reckless manslaughter requires proof that defendant was
aware of a substantial risk of death. Negligent homicide, a misdemeanor, also requires proof
of a substantial risk of death, but does not require any awareness of the risk. See State v.
Boss, 2005 UT App 520, % 14 n.2,127 P.2d 1236; State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1349 (Utah
App. 1991). Negligent homicide requires proof only that defendant "ought to be aware of
a substantial risk of death." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 (West 2004) & 176-2-103(4)
(Add. A). See also State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142,148 (Utah 1983) (recognizing that negligent
homicide is generally viewed as a lesser included offense of reckless manslaughter).
The prosecutor argued in closing that negligent homicide was not an appropriate lesser
include offense to consider because there was no factual basis to find that defendant was
unaware of the risk of death (R201: 217-18). Stee State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 560 (Utah
App. 1991) (holding that consideration of negligent homicide was not appropriate where the
defendant admitted that she stabbed the victim with a knife), cert denied, 843 P.2d 516
(Utah 1992); State v. Howard, 597 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1979) (recognizing that where the
defendant presents no evidence to support that he was unaware of the risk of death, an
instruction on negligent homicide was not justified). When defense counsel responded in
closing, he did not dispute this (R201: 225-38) (Add. Q . Nor did defense counsel otherwise
ask the court to consider the lesser offense of negligent homicide (R201: 246).
Now, for the first time on appeal, defendant claims that the facts only establish that
he was unaware of a substantial risk of death (negligent homicide), and are insufficient to
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establish that he was aware of the risk of death (manslaughter). See Br.Aplt. at 14-17.
Defendant is precluded from making this argument when he not only failed to make it below,
but led the trial court to believe that there was no factual basis to support it.
In sum, defendant's trial concession that the evidence, if believed, was sufficient to
establish murder precludes his appellate claim that the evidence, if believed, is insufficient
to establish the lesser offense of manslaughter. Similarly, defendant's failure at trial to claim
there was a factual basis to find that he was unaware of the risk of death (negligent homicide)
precludes his appellate claim that the facts establish that he was unaware of the risk.
(C)

Even if the Merits of the Sufficiency Challenge Are Considered, the
Clear Weight of the Evidence Supports the Trial Courfs Finding that
Defendant Was Aware of But Consciously Disregarded, a Substantial
Risk of Death Wlten He Stabbed Daniel.

Even if this Court reaches defendant's sufficiency claim, the claim lacks merit. The
clear weight of the marshaled evidence supports the trial court's finding that when defendant
stabbed Daniel, defendant was aware of, but consciously disregarded, a substantial risk that
death would result. See standard of review discussion at 19-20.
The State previously set forth the marshaled evidence. See Statement of Facts at 3-15
& discussion at 20-26. The following summary discusses the reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the marshaled evidence and in support of the finding and verdict.
Defendant did not shy away from fights. But he usually limited himself to fist-fights
because he knew that using a knife or gun in a fight created a risk of death. In fact, he
believed that if someone used a knife in a fight, the person intended to kill. These facts and
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inferences establish defendant's awareness of the substantial risk of death attendant in
stabbing a person. See Day, 815 P.2d at 1349 (intentionally pointing a gun at a person
establishes awareness of the risk sufficient for reckless manslaughter); State v. Wessendorf,
111 P.2d 523, 526 (Utah App.) (holding that defendant's own caution in dealing with
rattlesnake established subjective awareness of the risk an unrestrained snake created), cert
denied, 781 P.2d 878 (Utah 1989); State v. Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674,676 (Utah 1982) (holding
that Bindrup's own admission that he ran at least two other red lights established that he was
aware of the risks sufficient to find reckless manslaughter). See also State v. Robinson,
2003 UT App 1, f 10 n.3, 63 P.3d 105 (holding that an inadvertent pointing of gun did not
establish intent for manslaughter, but recognizing that purposeful aiming of gun would be
sufficient to establish reckless intent).
Daniel, on the other hand, did not like to fight. He fled as soon as the Islanders
invaded the Windsor apartment. And even when he realized he had dropped his telephone
in the driveway, he did not go back towards the apartment where the fight was, but sent
Chelsea back to look for it. Nevertheless, as he sat in his car waiting for Chelsea to return,
defendant assaulted him.
Chelsea did not hear Daniel say anything to provoke the fight, though defendant told
the police that Daniel said "something." In any case, defendant admitted that his adrenaline
was pumped from the fight with the Islanders and that he readily opened the car door and
punched Daniel rather than simply walking away. The fist fight ended a minute later when
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defendant knowingly plunged a knife into Daniel's thigh as the unarmed Daniel sat in his car.
The knife blade went fully into the thigh, some 3 lA inches, and hit one of two "significant"
branches of the femoral artery. Daniel immediately began losing blood.
Daniel fled to the safety of his mother's home eight blocks away. During his flight,
he lost a significant amount of blood—enough that there was an one-fourth or one-half inch
pool of blood on the floor of the car and more on the car's seat. Apparently, the blood loss
was already affecting Daniel because he hit the side of his mother's house as he drove into
her driveway. He fell or was pulled from the car and laid on the lawn, where he continued
to bleed. His brother attempted first aid. The police and EMTs were dispatched to the house
at 5:07 a.m.

Two minutes after the police arrived, the EMTs arrived.

The EMTs

immediately provided medical treatment. Five minutes later, they transported Daniel to the
hospital, where he received more medical treatment. But Daniel's blood loss was too acute
and he died.
These facts, together with the medical examiner's testimony, see Statement of Facts
at 7-9, establish that a substantial risk of death existed here. Contrary to defendant's claim,
see BrAplt. at 22, it is not necessary for the State to prove that defendant knew of the exact
location of the artery, but only that an artery if punctured could cause a person to bleed to
death. See State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303, 1309 (Utah App. 1991) (recognizing that proof
of recklessness does not require a specific knowledge of the premise location of the victims
when shot, but only an awareness of their presence in the house that was his target). And
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while it is true, as defendant contends, see Br.Aplt. at 23, that stabbing a thigh may not be
as risky as stabbing a heart, the fact that a heart carries an extreme risk of death does not
mean that stabbing a thigh does not carry a substantial risk of death. The likelihood of harm
is but one factor in determining the degree of risk; the other is the magnitude of the harm:
A risk may be substantial even if the chance the harm will occur is well below
fifty percent. Some risks may be substantial even if they carry a low degree
of probability because the magnitude of the harm is potentially great. For
example, if a person holds a revolver with a single bullet in one of the
chambers, points the gun at another's head and pulls the trigger, then the risk
is substantial even though the odds that death will result are no better than one
in six.
Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Substantive Criminal Law § 5.4(f) (2d ed. 2007). Consequently, "[a]
risk does not have to be 'more likely than not to occur9 or 'probable' in order to be
substantial." Id. See also Standiford, 769 P.2d at 263 n.9 (recognizing that "some
likelihood that death will occur" may create a substantial risk of death).
Defendant also asserts that defendant's culpability for Daniel's death should be lessen
because first aid was—he claims—unreasonably delayed. See Br.Aplt. at 20-22. As
previously discussed, supra at 22-23, the marshaled facts do not support this. But even if it
were established that first aid was unreasonably delayed, that fact would not mitigate
defendant's culpability. See Wessendorf, 111 P.2d at 526 (recognizing that "intervening
medical error is not a defense where the defendant has inflicted a mortal wound upon
another").
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It is well established that "the linchpin of causation is whether the superseding party's
acts were reasonably foreseeable." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1215.
An intervening, inde pendent agency will not exonerate the accused for
criminal liability from a victim's death unless the death is solely attributable
to the secondary agency, and not at all induced by the primary one. To qualify
as an intervening cause an event must be unforeseeable and one in which the
accused does not participate; an intervening cause must be so extraordinary
that it is unfair to hold the accused responsible for the death.
Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, defendant does not claim that Daniel's
death is "solely attributable" to a delay in receiving first aid. Instead, he merely claims only
that it contributed to Daniel's demise. See BrAplt. at 22 & 24.
Moreover, a delay in receiving first aid was foreseeable. Defendant stabbed Daniel
in a car in the street. Even assuming that a 16 minute delay followed, as claimed by
defendant, see Br.Aplt. at 18 & 20, such a delay is not "so extraordinary" that it is unfair to
hold defendant responsible for causing Daniel's death, especially where, as here, the delay
was caused by Daniel fleeing to the safety of his mother's home and the EMTs responding.
And though defendant chides Chelsea for not notifying the police of Daniel's injury when
they first interviewed her, defendant likewise did not tell the police that Daniel was injured
when he allegedly spoke to them immediately after stabbing Daniel.
In sum, defendant placed Daniel in peril by stabbing him and, therefore, must bear the
burden of the natural sequence of events that followed. See State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335,
339 (Utah 1980); Boss, 2005 UT App 520, \ 23 (both recognizing that causation is
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established when "a party by his wrongful conduct creates a condition of peril" that in "the
natural sequence of events" results in injury).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm defendant's manslaughter
conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ ^ d a y of June, 2007.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

iJ^f^o/^^
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General

41

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that four true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee were
mailed, postage prepaid, to DEBRA M. NELSON & MARIE MAXWELL, SALT LAKE
LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, attorneys for Defendant/Appellant, 424 East 500
South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, UT 84111, this ^ ^ d a y of June, 2007.

'fas

42

Addenda

Addendum A

CRIMINAL CODE

§ 7 6 - 1 - 6 0 1 . Definitions
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title:
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech.
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a
criminal action.
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of
physical condition.
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission.
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means:
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and:
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim
to reasonably believe the item is likely to c&use death or serious bodily
injury; or
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner
that he is in control of such an item.
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state.
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and
the actor is capable of acting.
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, or unincorporated association.
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise dominion
or control over tangible property.
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function
of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death.
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary
disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ.
(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, printing,
electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of recording information or fixing information in a form capable of being preserved.

§ 76-2-103,

Definitions

A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding
his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or
the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from
the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

§ 76-2-104.

Culpable mental state—Higher mental states included

(1) If acting with criminal negligence is sufficient to establish the culpable
mental state for an element of an offense, that element is also established if a
person acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.
(2) If acting recklessly is sufficient to establish the culpable mental state for
an element of an offense, that element is also established if a person acts
intentionally or knowingly.
(3) If acting knowingly is sufficient to establish the culpable mental state for
an element of an offense, that element is also established if a person acts
intentionally.

§ 76-5-203. Murder
(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means:
(a) a violation of Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5, Clandestine Drug Lab
Act;
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is
younger than 18 years of age;
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301;
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1;
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302;
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1;
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3;
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1;
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404;
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child under
Section 76-5-404.1;
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402;
(/) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2;
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403;
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405;
(o) arson under Section 76-6-102;
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103;
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202;
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203;
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301;
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; or
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309.
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if:
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits
an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, the actor engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to
another and thereby causes the death of another;
(d)(i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or
immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of any
predicate offense, or is a party to the predicate offense;
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed
in the course of the commission, attempted commission, or immediate
flight from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate
offense; and
(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of the
predicate offense;
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while in the
commission or attempted commission of:
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; or
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under
Section 76-8-305 if the actor uses force against a peace officer;

(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the
offense is reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(3); or
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is established under Section 76-5-205.5.
(3) Murder is a first degree felony.
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder
that the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death
of another:
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a
reasonable explanation or excuse; or
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal
justification or excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not legally
justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances.
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(i) emotional distress does not include:
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section
76-2-305; or
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct.
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection
(4)(a)(i) or the reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a)(ii) shall
be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then
existing circumstances.
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows:
(i) murder to manslaughter; and
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter.

§ 7 6 - 5 - 2 0 5 . Manslaughter
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor:
(a) recklessly causes the death of another;
(b) commits a homicide which would be murder, but the offense is reduced
pursuant to Subsection 76-5-203(4); or
(c) commits murder, but special mitigation is established under Section
76-5-205.5.
(2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree.

§ 76-5-206.

Negligent homicide

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the actor, acting with
criminal negligence, causes the death of another.
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor.

§ 76-5—209. Homicide by assault—Penalty
(1) A person commits homicide by assault if, under circumstances not
amounting to aggravated murder, murder, or manslaughter, a person causes
the death of another while intentionally or knowingly attempting, with unlawful
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another.
(2) Homicide by assault is a third degree felony.

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
R U L E 5 2 . FINDINGS BY THE COURT
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts .without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
5 8A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly
set forth the^ findings of fact, and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action* Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not bevset aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The
findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered"as the findings of tfie^ court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court
following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. TKe trial pourt need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b).
The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings
and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in
actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the
party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to such
findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or
a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Except in actions
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the
parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.

Aaaendu

May 10, 2006

9:58 AM

P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:

All right, this is the matter of the

State vs. Alejandro Carrillo and Raul Carrillo, case
Nos. 041906193 and 194.

Counsel, will you enter your

appearances for the record again, please.
MR. HALL:

Jeff Hall and Clark Harms for the State.

MS. GEORGE:

Julie George on behalf of Alejandro

Carrillo, who is here with me in court.
MR. HEINEMAN:

Rob Heineman and Marie Maxwell on

behalf of Raul Carrillo.
THE COURT:

Is there anything either of the parties

want to place on the record before I proceed to issue my
decision?
MR. HALL:
THE COURT:

Only if the Court has any questions.
I have no questions.

Mr. Heineman?
MR. HEINEMAN:

I would like the Court to place on the

record the lesser-included offenses that the Court considered,
and also a ruling as to whether it is the State's burden to
disprove extreme emotional disturbance beyond a reasonable
doubt.
THE COURT:

Ms. George?
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MS. GEORGE:
THE COURT:

Mr. Heineman, I am going to decline your

I don ! t think it is necessary.

invitation.
discussion

Nothing on my half.

We had this

—

MR. HALL:

Your Honor, forgive the interruption.

Before we get too far down the road, I make the observation,
because they aren T t there, although they were present when the
Court informed them we would reconvene this matter at ten
THE COURT:

—

Would you like me to wait for awhile?

That f s fine, I will wait for a few minutes.
MR. HALL:
THE COURT:

I apologize.
No, I appreciate you bringing that to my

attention.
(A pause in the proceedings.)
THE COURT:
MR. HALL:

Are we ready to proceed?
The victim's family is now present, and we

appreciate the Court's indulgence.

I think we are ready to

proceed.
THE COURT:

Let me begin by saying how much I

appreciate the lawyers1 efforts in this case.

This case was

marked by an extreme degree of professionalism and was
extraordinarily well tried and succinctly tried.

I greatly

appreciate that.
Also, and obviously, I want the parties to know that
I in making the following findings I employed the reasonable
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doubt standard.

I think that goes without saying;

nevertheless, I said it.
Now, having heard and considered all of the evidence
and the arguments of counsel, the Court rules as follows:

On

September 17, 2004, Daniel Johnson, the victim in this matter,
and Chelsea Stout participated in a party in an apartment off
of Windsor Circle, which is located at approximately 800 East
and 2700 South in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

The

defendants, the brothers Raul and Alejandro Carrillo, were
among others who also attended the party.
The party continued into the early hours of
September 18.

It ended rather abruptly when a group of males,

primarily of Pacific island descent, tried to push their way
into the dwelling.

In the process the intruders demanded to

know if the party participants were Tongans.

It would not be

the last time that evening that the defendant Raul Carrillo
would be taken for a Polynesian.
After the intrusion a melee broke out between the
intruders and the others.

As the fight participants were

scattering, Raul Carrillo found himself in the street, in front
of the apartment, close to Daniel Johnson!s car.
was seated in the driver's seat of his car.

Mr. Johnson

Why Raul Carrillo

approached Mr. Johnson, we may never truly know.

Mr. Carrillo

himself claims it was because they exchanged words.
What is known and beyond a reasonable doubt is that
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Raul Carrillo, as he himself confessed, took a knife and stuck
it one time, just one time, into Daniel Johnson's left thigh at
a spot about 5 inches above the knee.
confession.

A word about the

The Court has reviewed it and rereviewed it and

then reviewed portions of it again, each time becoming more
convinced of the truthfulness of Raul Carrillofs ultimate
confession.
The confession, however, does not stand alone.
is also the eyewitness account of Chelsea Stout.

There

Now, to say

that Ms. StoutTs testimony has problems would be a large
understatement.

Nevertheless, it is not without some force as

to the actual act of stabbing and the identity of the stabber,
subjects on which she remained relatively consistent.
In any event, Raul Carrillo stabbed Mr. Johnson with
a blade that was approximately 1 centimeter wide at its widest
point, and 8.5 inches long —

or, rather, 3.5 inches.

The stab

wound partially transected a significant branch of
Mr. Johnson's femoral artery, and caused Mr. Johnson to bleed
to death.

The death occurred in Salt Lake County.
The evidence does not support a finding beyond a

reasonable doubt, as the State maintains, that Defendant
Alejandro Carrillo gave his brother the knife or that he
intended for his brother to use it to attack Mr. Johnson.

As

an aside here, having reviewed and rereviewed the confession,
it does not in any way, shape or form corroborate the StateTs
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position on this point.

Therefore, the Court finds the

defendant Alejandro Carrillo not guilty of murder in the first
degree.
As to Defendant Raul Carrillo, the Court does not
find that the evidence supports a determination beyond a
reasonable doubt that, A, he intentionally or knowingly caused
the death of Daniel Johnson; B, that he committed an act
clearly dangerous to human life; or, C, that he engaged in
conduct that created a grave risk of death while acting under
circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life.
Therefore, the Court also finds the defendant Raul Carrillo not
guilty of murder in the first degree.
However, the Court does find the defendant Raul
Carrillo acted recklessly, as that term is defined by the Utah
criminal code, and that he recklessly caused the death of
Daniel Johnson.

Therefore, the Court finds the defendant Raul

Carrillo guilty of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter,
a second-degree felony,
Mr. Hall, I am going to ask you provide written
findings and conclusions that are consistent with the CourtTs
oral ruling.

We are adjourned.

Let's have the defendant Raul Carrillo and his
counsel brought back out.

Before I proceed, let me note the

defendant Raul Carrillo is present along with counsel.
Mr. Heineman, I decline your invitation.
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MR. HEINEMAN:
THE COURT:

I withdraw that request.

Raul Roberto Carrillo, having been found

guilty of manslaughter, a second-degree felony, we need to
proceed to sentence you in this particular matter.

I am going

to ask AP&P prepare an updated and new presentence report in
connection with the matter.

Counsel, do you waive the maximum

time for sentencing?
MR. HEINEMAN:
THE COURT:

Yes.

You have the right to be sentenced in not

fewer than two days or more than 45 days.

Do you agree with

your counsel's waiver of the right to be sentenced in not less
than 45 days?
MR. HEINEMAN:

He wants to take a little bit more

than 45 days to have a presentence report prepared.

Are you

okay with that?
THE DEFENDANT RAUL CARRILLO:
THE COURT:
presentence report.

Yes.

AP&P will receive the referral, prepare a
We will set sentencing for . . .

THE CLERK:

June 30.

THE COURT:

June 30 at 9:00 a.m.

All right, we are

adjourned.
(These proceedings were concluded.)
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Addendum C

Q

That f s what she testified to under oath here

yesterday, correct?
A

Yes.

Q

And then she said, I saw Raul with a knife, correct?

A

Yes.
MS. GEORGE:

No further questions, your Honor.

MR. HEINEMAN:
THE COURT:

Nothing further.

Thank you.

You may step down.

Call your next witness.
MS. GEORGE:

Your Honor, on behalf of Alejandro

Carrillo, we have no other witnesses.
THE COURT:

Mr. Heineman?

MR. HEINEMAN:
THE COURT:
MR. HALL:
State rests.

We rest.

Raul Carrillo would rest as well.

Rebuttal?
There is no rebuttal, your Honor.

The

Thank you.

THE COURT:

All right, we will proceed to closing.

Do you want to talk about -- you have this concept of
instructions in mind which is an unfamiliar one to me in a
bench trial, frankly, Ms. George.
MS. GEORGE:

Do you want a full set or do you want us

to just argue what we believe the law is?
THE COURT:

I want you to argue what the law is.

Instructions are unnecessary.
MR. HALL:

I was tempted to read all the jury
20Q

instructions to the Court as part of my closing argument.
THE COURT:

I think that?s an excellent idea.

Why

don T t you get even with me for all the years I have tortured
people.

I want you to do it with some zest.

If you want me to

have them and consider them, I will certainly do that.

That

has not been my practice nor experience nor do I think it is in
any way required.

They exist to provide jurors with an

indication of what the law is.

You can certainly argue those

points to me.
MR. HALL:
THE COURT:
MR. HALL:
THE COURT:
MR. HALL:

Very well, your Honor.
Are you prepared to close?
Yes, your Honor.
Please proceed.
Thank you, your Honor.

May it please the

Court, in some ways, your Honor, this is a straightforward
case.

And I begin as Mr. Harms began, what brings us here is

Daniel Johnson, who is no longer with us, at the hands of the
defendants, who are before you today, who entered the courtroom
with a presumption of innocence until such time as the State
has proved their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

And now that

the State has adduced evidence to prove their guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, it now becomes my duty, my responsibility and
my privilege to state to the Court the summary of the evidence
and what it means.
I first invite from the Court, as I was taught to do
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1

by a mentor of mine who used to sit on the Third District Court

2

bench, to invite any questions from the Court first.
THE COURT:

3
4

I was going to ask if counsel minded if I

asked any questions during the closing.
MR. HALL:

5

Your Honor, that would be helpful, because

6

I don't want the Court to wonder about "X" and for me to stand

7

up here and argue about "Y."

8

lack of general remarks that I would hope the Court would allow

9

me to make at an appropriate time.

Please don't mistake it for any

10

THE COURT: Mr. Heineman?

11

MR. HEINEMAN:

12

THE COURT:

No objection, Judge.

I'm not looking for an objection versus

13

just a preference.

14

participated by asking questions, and wonder what your

15

preference is.

16

make a traditional closing, and sit here and not ask questions.

17
18
19

I have frequently, as you know,

I have also had lawyers tell me they prefer to

MR. HEINEMAN:

I try not to be that rigid, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

The other thing I would caution everyone

20

is if I do ask any questions, not to take anything away from

21

them, no indication of a suggestion of what I am thinking.

22

Sometimes we ask questions just to play the devil's advocate.

23

So you never know.

24
25

MR. HALL:

Go right ahead.
Thank you, your Honor.

I would like to

address my argument, my remarks, in two phases. And whereas

sometimes the State ! s rebuttal argument comes after the
Defense's closing, in light of the Court as the trier of fact,
if the Court will allow me a little leeway to proceed with an
argument that I hope characterizes the evidence and places it
into context so that the Court clearly understands the State!s
position.
I am not a civil lawyer, I haven ? t had any experience
with it, but I know a little bit about it, and I know in many
trials, many civil actions there is a bifurcation between
liability and damages.

I would like to maybe focus my remarks

with that bifurcation in mind, and I will begin by discussing
maybe the facts of the case and what tends to prove liability
or guilt to begin with, and some of my remarks later on I think
I would like to address what that means, what impact those
facts have on the law.
We have heard and the Court has patiently and
attentively listened to the testimony of witnesses who
described an unfortunate event, but one that was criminal,
unavoidable, but one for which there must be accountability and
justice.
Daniel Johnson went to a party with Chelsea Stout
without any idea that it would be essentially the last thing he
ever did.

I think that the defendants were at that party

without ever thinking that they would be responsible for the
death of Daniel Johnson.

The State has never argued that it
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was the desire or the hope of these defendants to kill Daniel
Johnson.

As the Court knows, that's not required for a

conviction of murder in the State laws of Utah.

I will address

that in more detail later.
What I think is important to understand is that there
is uncontroverted evidence to a couple of very important,
salient points.

We can discuss whether Chelsea Stout described

the clothing, the shorts or the sweats and described whether
Chelsea had women with her or not.

We can argue or debate

about the details of whether or not someone was accurately
testifying to all the particular details.

The Court will

observe that these events happened nearly two years ago.

The

preliminary hearing was almost a year and a half ago.
I think Chelsea's testimony, while coming from an
unsophisticated victim witness, and with blemishes and all, was
very telling on a couple of critical points, and that is what
she saw that night.

She saw the defendant Alejandro Carrillo

hand something to the defendant Raul Carrillo, and immediately
it was open and it was a knife.

And I think there is no

question beyond a reasonable doubt what Alejandro had and
handed to Raul.

It was a knife.

And immediately thereafter

Raul plunged that knife 8.5 centimeters into the flesh of
Daniel Johnson, thereby creating a wound from which he bled to
death.
Now, 8.5 centimeters is something that the Court can
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determine.

I measured 8.5 centimeters.

that I intend to mark.
can measure it.

It is purely demonstrative.

The Court

Counsel can measure it if they want.

THE COURT:
MR. HALL:
long.

It is not an exhibit

I have measured it.

I have it.

And that, your Honor, is 8.5 centimeters

It is the length of the wound created by Raul Carrillo

when he plunged that knife into the flesh of Daniel Johnson.
The liability in the case is clear.
it.

These two did

And there is uncontroverted evidence that on that night

these two defendants were responsible for handing the knife to
the stabber and the stabber killing Daniel Johnson.
What that means is what I would like to address in my
rebuttal argument, and how the law is applied to those facts is
what I intend to conclude with at the end of my remarks.

So I

will invite any questions from the Court up to this point.
Otherwise, I will reserve the remainder of my remarks for my
rebuttal.
MR. HEINEMAN:

Judge, I am going to object.

is supposed to be for rebuttal.

Rebuttal

If the Prosecution has legal

argument, they should be making that argument in their argument
in chief.
THE COURT:

Mr. Hall, I think if you want —

as I see

it, you want to argue the penalty, whether it constitutes
murder or any other offense?
MR. HALL:

Yes, your Honor.

I would be happy to do
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that now.
THE COURT:

I think you should address it now.

will sustain the objection.
phase for just a second.

I

But let's talk about the liability

What do you do, what do you say to

the undisputed statement that, essentially, is a dying
declaration the victim in this case identified another
perpetrator?
MR. HALL:
perpetrator.

I f m not sure that he did identify another

He didn f t identify the names of anyone.

What he

identified was a description of a person that stabbed him.
way he identified him was as Polynesian.

The

I think that would

raise some reasonable doubt if somebody from a drastically
different-looking ethnic background or maybe gender were
described.
But the Court has to remember the condition of Daniel
when he made the dying declaration.

The Court has seen the

amount of blood loss that occurred when he made that statement.
The Court knows the circumstances under which he was on death's
doorstep.

So I think the Court can take a couple of things

away from that.
100 percent.

"A," I don't think the reliability is

And, certainly, we are not trying to suggest that

he was misleading anyone.

I think that in the state that he

was in, to the extent that he could, he made a statement it was
a Polynesian that stabbed him.
THE COURT:

It is a big Polynesian stabbed him.
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MR. HALL:

I don ! t think that is widely divergent,

given the state of the victim at the time, from the physical
description of the person who stabbed him.

And I certainly

don ! t think that rises to reasonable doubt that we ought to be
looking for a Polynesian, especially when we take it into
context with all the other evidence.
THE COURT:

They had spent the night together.

had been together for hours during that evening.
nothing.

They

And he does

He doesn't use any names or any other indication.

And the ME suggests, does he not, there is no reason to doubt
the voracity of Mr. Johnson?

The loss of blood, that

responding to the question would not indicate a higher
function, and that the loss of blood at the time, in the ME ? s
opinion, would not impact his ability to truthfully respond to
that question.
MR. HALL:

Or, as I determine it, the higher function

would be to create a deception, to know the truth and then
fabricate something other than what he knows is the truth.
THE COURT:

You are certainly not suggesting that he

did that, and neither is the Defense.
MR. HALL:
THE COURT:
a —

Right.
What you are arguing is really kind of

that the defendant Raul Carrillo can fit the description

of a big Polynesian, period.
MR. HALL:

A bottom line like this, he was real
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close, especially considering the state that he was in.
That, coupled with Raul's admission, eventually,
after being very deceptive to the police, eventually admitting
that he was the stabber, I don't think this is a case of who
done it.

If we didn ! t have that, if we didn ! t have the other

evidence of Chelsea seeing him do it, and the defendant
admitting to the police that he did it, if we didn T t have that,
your Honor, then I think I would agree with the Court that
there is this possibility that maybe it was a Polynesian that
stabbed him.

But when we take it together with the totality of

the evidence, the identity of the stabber is not the question
that I think the Court needs to get its mind around at this
point, with all due respect.
THE COURT:
MR. HALL:

All right.

Go ahead.

Your Honor, the Court can consider

lesser-included instructions as it

SBOS

fit.

I think that the

law instructs us that if you don't find the elements of the
charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt you may consider some
of the lesser-included.

So while this is not the way I would

necessarily approach the deliberation or the evaluation of the
lesser includeds, I don't think there is anything to keep the
Court from doing it, but I do it to illustrate the problems
with the lesser-included offenses.
I believe that at least one of the parties has asked
the Court to consider the lesser-included offense, what they
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suggest a lesser-included offense, of negligent homicide.
There is no evidence here that anyone acted negligently when
they caused the death of Daniel Johnson.
of negligence.

There is no evidence

The failure to use due care.

This wasn't an

This wasn ? t a misstep on the part of the stabber.

accident.

It was an intentional act.

And I think there is no evidence

before the Court that there was anything other than a
deliberate, intentional act that certainly wasn f t negligence.
I think that the Court does not have evidence before it to
warrant a consideration, even if it were arguably a lesserincluded offense, that would warrant the Court to consider that
as a lesser-included offense.
The next, least-severe lesser-included offense is the
crime of homicide by assault.

As the Court knows, that

requires the Court to find in Salt Lake County, on or about
September 18, the defendant caused the death of another while
intentionally or knowingly attempting with unlawful force or
violence to do bodily injury to another.
of assault.

That T s the definition

The Court knows an assault is an act or an attempt

to do bodily injury, and as the Court knows bodily injury is
defined among other things as physical pain.
The crime is not homicide by aggravated assault.
crime is homicide by assault.

The

And when an assailant, a killer,

uses a dangerous weapon -- and the Court can find that a knife
is a dangerous weapon under the definition of dangerous
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weapons —

that when the defendant commits his crime by

aggravated assault, there is not evidence before the Court that
an assault was committed.

It is not aggravated assault.

And,

furthermore, just from logically and jurisprudentially, if that
were not so, then every homicide would have as its
lesser-included offense homicide by assault.
that.

And we don ! t see

It is an unusual crime to convict someone of homicide by

assault.

It is not routine for us to argue in jury trials that

there is a lesser-included of homicide by assault, because many
of the homicides that we have involve the use of a weapon,
which would be an aggravated assault.
THE COURT:

Where is the dangerous weapon definition?

MR. HEINEMAN:
MR. HALL:

76-1-601, Judge.

Many of those definitions are in that

chapter.
THE COURT:
MR. HALL:

All right.
So once a dangerous weapon is used the

crime is not assault, it is aggravated assault, and, therefore,
a homicide by assault is not applicable in this case.

It is

not truly a lesser-included.
I think the Court would appropriately consider the
proper lesser-included offense here of manslaughter.

As the

Court knows, that is a situation in which the actor recklessly
causes the death of another, or causes the death of another
under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which
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there is a reasonable explanation.

I don't believe there is

any evidence before the Court of either an extreme emotional
disturbance or a reasonable explanation.

Or that he causes the

death of another under circumstances where the actor reasonably
believes the circumstances provide a legal justification.
There has been no evidence presented before the Court that
either of these individuals either reasonably believed or in
fact had a legal justification.

So there is only one prong of

the manslaughter that could apply, and that is recklessly
causes the death of another.
And the reason I believe that the Court ought to
continue in its analysis upward in the severity of the crimes
is as illustrated in the instruction here for murder.

We

conceded at the beginning, and it is I think telling from the
preparation of this instruction, that we have omitted the first
definition of murder, because we have never argued or believed
or asserted that either of these defendants set out on the 17th
or the 18th of September with the hope and desire of their
heart to kill anyone.

So we have left that element out of this

instruction, in all candor to the Court.
So Alejandro Carrillo, as a party to the offense, is
yoked to the actions of his brother by handing him the
instrument of Daniel Johnsonfs death.

He as a party is weighed

and judged along with Raul Carrillo's actions, and that's why I
want to focus on what Raul did.
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Raul commits murder by intending to cause serious
bodily injury.

Serious bodily injury, your Honor, is defined

in the code, and I submit to you that 8.5-centimeter wound,
gouge, hole in the flesh of Daniel Johnson constitutes serious
bodily injury.

If it were a glancing knife blow, I would have

a different opinion.

If it were a slash, I would reconsider.

But he plunged the knife into Daniel Johnson!s leg and caused
an 8.5-centimeter hole, gash.

That's serious bodily injury.

And there is no other intent that the Court can draw from that
act other than intending to cause an 8.5-centimeter hole in
Daniel Johnson.
He committed an act clearly dangerous to human life.
This 8.5 centimeters I think is telling.

8.5 centimeters is

the intent to cause the serious bodily injury and it is an act
clearly dangerous to human life which called the death of
Daniel Johnson.

That's murder, and that is what Raul Carrillo

did, and that is what Alejandro Carrillo helped him to do.
Or acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved
indifference to human life.

We have the definition, some

guidance for depraved indifference to human life, and there has
been a lot of discussion about CPR, who could have saved whom,
and the needless death.

Your Honor, I would suggest that there

are a couple of things that evidence the depraved indifference
on the part of the defendants to human life.

The primary one

is 8.5 centimeters, the wound, plunged the knife into Daniel
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Johnson.
There were four people who knew Daniel had been
stabbed:

Daniel himself, Chelsea, Raul, probably or possibly

Alejandro.

He handed the knife to his brother, who plunged the

knife into Daniel, it would be difficult to argue he didn't
know he had been stabbed, but I suppose he could.
Daniel did what many people might do in those
circumstances.

He drove himself to the place where he thought

he might get help the quickest.
house.

He went 8.5 blocks to his

If he had gone to a hospital, if he had done this, if

he had done that, those aren't defenses to the crime of
homicide.

We don't have somebody who gets shot and bleeds out

and say, well, the defense is he could have been saved quicker.
That's not a defense.

The Court won't find that in the law.

Chelsea knew he had been stabbed, but Chelsea was
attacked by the defendants and knocked unconscious, and when
she came to it took a while for her to put together what had
been going on.

The Court remembers the testimony she went

looking for Daniel.

She knew at some point he had been stabbed

and had driven off, but the result of her injuries must have
been such that as she was coming to she wasn't thinking
100 percent and started looking for Daniel.
Raul Carrillo knew that he had just plunged a knife
all the way into Daniel Johnson's leg.

We haven't heard any

discussion here about how neither of these individuals did
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anything as well.

They knew what had just happened.

It may

seem on its face odd for us to suggest that the stabbers, the
killers of Daniel Johnson would do something about it.

If we

are going to talk about lifesaving techniques and measures,
they knew what had happened, and not only did they do nothing,
they left.

Those are circumstances evidencing a depraved

indifference to human life.

They didn't give a damn.

depraved indifference to human life.

That's

He knowingly engaged in

conduct which created a grave risk of death to another.

We

know it created a grave risk of death, because Daniel Johnson
is dead.
Either prong describes
THE COURT:

—

That's a bit tautological, isn't it?

It

doesn't say which caused the death, but which created a grave
risk of death, and the fact that someone ultimately dies
doesn't establish a grave risk of death.
MR. HALL:

That's for the Court to decide whether an

8.5-inch hole made by the knife blade -THE COURT:

But the argument you make is we can

assume that it created a grave risk of death because there was
a death?
MR. HALL:

No.

I concede that just because there was

a death doesn't necessarily, but I think it is helpful for the
Court to decide this was a grave risk of death.
THE COURT:

All right.
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MR. HALL:

And so, your Honor, I ask the Court, I ask

the Court, and having taken an oath to defend the constitution
and represent the people of the State of Utah, we ask the
Court, and on behalf of Daniel Johnson's family, who has been
present throughout these entire proceedings and is present here
today, and on behalf of Daniel, who can f t do it himself, but
which privilege falls to me, we ask the Court to find the
defendants guilty of murder.
Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Mr. Heineman?

MR. HEINEMAN:

Does the Court have any initial

questions?
THE COURT:

Go ahead and start.

I do have several

for you.
MR. HEINEMAN:

I would like to start by saying how

sorry everyone is that Daniel Johnson is dead.
did not deserve to die.

Certainly, he

He should not have died.

And we want

to express our remorse for that situation to his friends,
family, and all who knew him.

Obviously, this isn't a happy

circumstance, but it has occurred, and here we are trying to
mop up afterwards.
In terms of finding Raul Carrillo guilty of this
offense, I see it as the Court having two possible ways of
getting there.

One is to believe that he confessed to the

officers that he stabbed Daniel Johnson.

The other is to
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believe Chelsea Stout and her testimony that that is what she
saw.
With respect to the confession, the officer spent a
long time trying to convince Raul Carrillo that he stabbed
someone, but they donT t get there.

They are able to get him to

repeat words, yeah, I guess I did it.
him.

Okay.

Yeah, I stabbed

But repeatedly and always he goes back, I don't remember

having a knife.
kind of guy.

I f m not that kind of guy.

I fight with my fists.

I am a knuckle up

Looking at his demeanor

during the course of that video, and, obviously, demeanor is
easier to see live in person, but it comes out and it just hits
you, when he is told that he is the one they think stabbed, me,
for real?

And then his head goes down and hits that desk,

absolutely shocked and can f t believe it.
THE COURT:

What do you say to the one time during

the interview where there does appear to be an unsolicited
admission, not a repeat, but quote, "Kind of chicken shit for
me stabbing him, too."
MR. HEINEMAN:

I say that is still in the context of

these officers trying to say we have all kinds of witnesses and
everyone saw you do it.

We have people in the back seat of the

car, other people standing around, everyone saying they saw you
do it.

At that point what he is saying is if I were the guy

who did it, yeah, that would be pretty chicken shit.
THE COURT:

No, it is a different context.

The
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detective is indicating it was kind of chicken shit for Daniel
to have hit him through the car window, open, and at this point
in time your client responds, "Yeah, but it was kind of chicken
shit for me stabbing him, too."
MR. HEINEMAN:

And the words are what they are and

the Court is reading them correctly.

But he is still in the

mind-set that, oh, my God, there is all this evidence, it seems
like I am the guy that did it, but I don't remember it, but I
must be the guy that did it, the cops are saying they are
trying to cut me some slack, they have all these witnesses, I
must be the guy.

It is a responsive statement saying it is

chicken shit to just stab somebody.

And while it is not

phrased in the context of, I don't remember having a knife, but
if I did do it

—

THE COURT:

In fairness to you, he does say that a

little later.
MR. HEINEMAN:

A little later he does.

Taken in the

context throughout he never says, okay, all right, I have been
leading you on.

I did it.

I remember.

don't know what I was thinking.

I had a knife.

I

Throughout, he is saying, and

I will paraphrase, I am screwing myself over, but I don't
remember having a knife.
officers keep going.
stand.

Repeatedly throughout that.

And the

You are going to look like a fool on the

You can't say that.

The judge isn't going to buy it.

You need to man up, take responsibility.

I don't remember.
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And then we have the end of the interview, and we
didn T t play the whole thing, but 15 minutes of unconsolable
sobbing.

I think it is clear from watching the interview that

Raul didn't know there was a video camera in the corner, and
the officers kept, well, we will turn the tape off.

What do

you want to tell us now?

Every time that happens, I don't

remember having a knife.

It was news to him.

Now, it was clear from the interview that he had
heard about Daniel.

He had seen the obituary in the paper.

He

knew the night had gone terribly wrong, and Daniel had died as
a result.

So it wasn't a surprise that somebody died.

not where the sobbing and this reaction is coming from.

That's
This

reaction is coming from, people are saying it is me that did
that?

I am the one who did that?

It is not that Daniel had died.
seen the obituary.
each other.

That's where the shock is.
He already knew that.

He said that at the end.

He had

Our families know

We had been hanging at the party for hours and

hours and hours.

He honestly doesn't remember stabbing him.

And I would assert to the Court that there is
certainly a reasonable doubt as to who did.

The testimony was

we can't ascertain exactly how many people were there.

We know

there were some people there, Cole Peterson and whoever he was
with, who weren't inside of the party.
others.
were.

We don't know.

There may have been

We don't know how many cars there

This was a riot, a melee, people everywhere fighting,
227

crazmess going on.
We do know the Polynesians that invaded the home,
several of them got stabbed.

It is reasonable to draw

inferences that perhaps that might upset them, that perhaps
that might get them to want to retaliate in some fashion.

We

have evidence of the drive-by shooting some period of time
later, where a whole slew of bullets are sent at this
particular apartment house.
The situation we are dealing with, five home invaders
forcing their way in, fighting with people, trying to steal
beer, broken glass, people thrown through windows, chaos.
have got the people at the party and these invaders.

We

Does it

make sense that in all of that Raul Carrillo would deliberately
go to stab one of the people he has been hanging at the party
with, Daniel Pacheco, Simon Apodaca, Chelsea Stout, Daniel
Johnson?

That doesn't make sense.

Does it make sense for a

big Polynesian, either one of the five that went in, or someone
associated with them outside, would be upset that they were
stabbed inside in the course of trying to do this beer heist
burglary?
THE COURT:

I have two questions for you.

One, what

do you say to Mr. Hall ! s response that there is nothing wrong
with the dying declaration that he was killed by a big
Polynesxan, and that, in fact, your client in some regards
meets that description?
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MR. HEINEMAN:

I would say that is counteracted by

the fact that Daniel was there with him for 8.5 hours.
knew each other.

They

Chelsea, obviously, is very up and aware of

different cultures and cultural differences.

She had no

problem saying Mexican, Mexican, Samoan.
THE COURT:

Second, during the interview of your

client, there is no question, you are correct, that he
repeatedly denies any recollection of using a knife.

But he

never denies, if I recall correctly, going to the car and
striking the deceased, the victim.
MR. HEINEMAN:

He never denies going to a car and

striking the occupant of that car.

There is a whole bunch of

fighting going on all over the street.
THE COURT:

I will go back and I'm certainly going to

relook at everything, but my recollection is that he
acknowledges striking, he pretty candidly acknowledges striking
the victim.
MR. HEINEMAN:

But that's after he is steered by the

police officer, it is you, we saw you, the colors are close
enough, they match, this is you, this is what happened.

We

don't know whether there is another car, Raul is there having a
fistfight with a guy there, and one of the Polynesians is there
stabbing Daniel.

Certainly possible that that is what

happened.
THE COURT:

Your suggestion is go back and look at it
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harder, Judge, because I think he is being led into that?
MR. HEINEMAN:

The cop is jumping to the assumption

we are talking about Daniel's car, and Raul gets led along with
that, but we don't know.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. HEINEMAN:

Go ahead.

Raul's statement is that he is

directly in front of the apartment house where he is having his
fight.

The diagram we have here, Exhibit 14, Daniel's car is

further along on the street.

Raul could have been right in

front with the car, two cars behind Daniel's car, duking it out
with some other person.
maybe.

We don't know who.

Cole Peterson,

He hasn't been helpful to come here and show up.

Nobody has been helpful in terms of coming forward and
testifying, other than Chelsea, obviously.
With respect to Chelsea, she is not crystal clear in
her memory.

She is all over the map.

Mr. Hall says, well,

this is the one thing she is consistent about.
one thing she wants to be consistent about.
seems to kind of get lost.

Well, it is the

Every other detail

Well, he said, I love you, as he

drives off right after he got stabbed.

No, no, he never said

anything.
I sat there —

I stood there at the podium at the

preliminary hearing, and she lied under oath, right to my face,
repeatedly.

She admitted that here on the stand.

We instruct

jurors that if someone has lied once you can toss everything
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out.

Obviously, that's a bit mechanistic.

I am not suggesting

that people should automatically toss things out, but it sure
creates doubt.
Her initial report to the police, nothing about a
stabbing of my boyfriend.
up.

It is, ow, my ribs hurt.

She knows she is okay.

she is not in any peril.

Yeah, she is in pain.

I got beat
She knows

She is saying she watched her

boyfriend, her fiancee get stabbed.
knows it happened more than once.

She saw it once.

She

Not a word comes up?

That

doesn f t make sense, Judge.
Later she finds out, oh, my gosh, Daniel is dead.
She tries to put things together.
I think she is confused.
Raul.

She wants to find something.

Obviously, she had been talking to

They had been talking about tattoos, been showing

tattoos, saying I know someone who can get yours fixed up, get
it done right.

Sure she knows about the Joker tattoo.

The

question is, did she actually see who did it, and was it Raul?
Other aspects of what she told us.

Knock on the

door, a bit before 5:00 in the morning, at somebody else ! s
house, she says she is the one that goes and answers the door.
And then she gets in the face of five big Polynesians.
Justin Shelton wasn't Polynesian.
Shelton.

I guess

Four Polynesians and Justin

Then she says she gets slammed down to the ground,

hand in the face, forced down.
What's the next part of the story?

Her boyfriend,
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who loves her, wants to protect her and be with her, I will
just scurry out the door and let these guys beat up my
girlfriend.

Does that make sense?

It doesn't make sense to

me.
Her testimony at the preliminary hearing, Daniel gets
stabbed, he says out the window of the car, I love you, and
drives off, as she is forced to the ground and kicked by
Samoans and beaten up.
beaten up right now.
doesn't make sense.

I love you, Babe.

Sorry about that.

Good luck getting
I got to go.

If she had said that he said, Run,

Chelsea, run, I can believe that, that makes sense.
you.

Drive off.

That

Doesn't make sense.

I love

And then, of course, we

hear yesterday, no, no, he never said that.

I'm not sure which

is the lie, the preliminary hearing or here, one of them is,
because they are diametrically opposed.
In terms of possible bias, Chelsea talked about how
Raul was hitting on her.

After the fact, her last night with

her boyfriend, and some guy was hitting on her?
make her angry.
didn't care.

That would

In the interview with Detective Parks Daniel

That's fine.

Whatever.

Guys being guys.

Her

testimony yesterday, of course, it would make him mad.
I'm not sure what's going on there.

Possibilities,

well, maybe Daniel doesn't love her as much as she thinks he
should.

One possibility, well, I will get even with someone

for that.

Another possibility, well, why am I wasting my time
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talking to some other guy the night that my boyfriend dies?
That f s a possibility.
Thrown over the top of all of that, five shots of
brandy, two beers, one line of coke, being knocked out, coming
to inside the house with the police there, this is someone who
isn't able to accurately recall, who is confused, doesn't
understand what's going on, that's only heightened later when
she finds out that Daniel has died, and in trying to piece it
together and make sense out of things, well, yeah, this is what
must have happened.
Were there two people in the back seat of Daniel's
car?

Certainly, no one came in to testify saying I was there

and this is what I saw.

But she testifies, well, she says in

the Parks interview, Beverly, she points out where exactly
Beverly is sitting.

There was the other woman there.

crawled out the window together.
me.

We

Yesterday, no, it was just

Whole people are disappearing here.

But the State is

asking you, well, never mind the man behind the curtain.
Consistent on this one thing, yeah, why don't we find Raul and
Alex guilty of murder.

I would submit that there is doubt

there.
In terms of the degree of offenses, for the murder
offense there has to be the intent to cause serious bodily
injury.
Homicide by assault, and I would point out to the
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Court that an aggravated assault is an assault.
meets the definition of homicide by assault.

It absolutely

There is nothing

in there saying but this is not applicable if a weapon is used.
Any kind of an attempt to cause bodily injury, with or without
a weapon, if death results, that r s homicide by assault.
The distinction there is the intent.
trying to accomplish?

What are you

If you are trying to seriously mess

somebody up, possibly kill them, permanently disfigure them,
cause them the loss of use of a bodily member for a protracted
period of time, that bumps it up to murder.
If you are just trying to hurt somebody, then we are
dealing with a homicide by assault.

A knife wound.

to the ER f s, they see them every, single day.

If we go

If you ever talk

to a medical student that works in an inner city hospital, you
know they have acronyms for what they see on a regular basis.
GSW, gunshot wound, knife wounds.

They see it all the time.

A knife wound generally isn't fatal.
exceptions.
problems.

There are

Stab somebody in the throat or neck, boom, serious
Stab somebody in the heart, boom, serious problems.

Stab somebody elsewhere in the chest, we are down a level,
still extremely threatening, a serious problem, but not as
immediately life threatening as a neck or a heart wound.
Stab somebody in the thigh, what's supposed to happen
with that?
little bit.

It is supposed to hurt.

It is supposed to bleed a

They are supposed to get a couple of stitches.
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1

They are supposed to be okay.

2

himself in the thigh.

3

University.

4

around your fingers, he missed and stabbed himself in the

5

thigh.

6

gets stitched up, cops are called, gets interrogated for some

7

period of time, give him up. We know somebody stabbed you.

8

No, really, it was me.

9

it myself.

10

I have got a cousin who stabbed

He was in a fraternity at Michigan State

He was playing a game with a knife trying to poke

Goes to the emergency room, friends take him there,

I was at the fraternity house.

No, no, we don't believe that.

I did

That's what is

supposed to happen with a knife wound.

11

What happened in this case, convergence of two

12

necessary things. Number one, it was a very unique wound,

13

partially transecting the artery.

14

no problem, would have been a case just like my cousin's, go

15

get a couple of stitches, good to go.

16

transected the artery, again, the artery would pinch off

17

itself.

18

Iraq with no legs.

19

unique type of wound, number one.

If it had missed the artery,,

If it had completely

We have all kinds of boys and girls coming home from
They don't bleed to death.

Number two, lack of first aid.

20

It is this

Daniel goes home.

21

wants to get help.

22

grabs on.

23

been done?

24

they could, as if someone's life depended on it, and it did.

25

He

In terms of first aid rendered, nobody

No one tries to stop the bleeding.

What should have

Somebody should have grabbed on, pressed as hard as

Four cops, hey, let's stand around and watch this guy

bleed out.

Gee, I don f t want to get blood on my uniform.

hear sirens somewhere.
are here.

I

We will just wait until the EMS people

Those six minutes the ME testified could well have

been critical.

No question about it.

So those two things, very unique wound, which isn T t
expected.

And when someone stabs someone in the leg, they are

not expecting, hey, I am going to get lucky and partially
transect a major branch of the femoral artery, and then maybe
the guy wonf t get first aid and I might get lucky and get a
kill.

That's not the thought process.

It is an I am going to

stick you.
It is not an intent to try to kill.

You try to kill,

throat, chest, or multiple, again and again and again and
again, cases where we have 15, 20, 30 stab wounds, yeah, there
you have got an intent.

It is evident.

This isn ! t just a

stick it to you, this is going to hurt you a little bit, take
you out of the action for the rest of the fight, but you will
be back another day, but a single knife wound to the thigh.
Mr. Hall made much of the 8.5 centimeters.

The quadriceps is

the second-largest muscle in the human body, second only to the
gluteus maximus.

It is a big muscle.

It can take a big knife

wound, and most of them are just fine.
If the Court finds that Raul Carrillo is responsible
for this, what level of offense should he be guilty of?
saw the interview there.

You

I think it is clear from that he
9*36

never intended to kill anybody.
my life, sobbing wildly.
wound.

I have never killed anybody in

The nature, the location of the

That f s not where you go to kill somebody.

Lower thigh.

Our special forces aren f t taught, hey, this is a special spot
here.

Go for the thigh about 4 or 5 inches up from the

kneecap.

Nonsense.

You do that, the other person is still in

it and you are dead.

You want to kill somebody, neck, chest.

Thigh, it is an assault, it obviously has the intent to injure
someone, cause them pain.

It doesn't have the intent to cause

serious bodily injury.
If the Court doesn't buy that argument and finds that
there is the intent to do serious bodily injury here, I would
submit the most we can get is manslaughter.

The statute,

76-5-204 subsection (4), it is an affirmative defense to a
charge of murder or attempted murder that the defendant caused
the death of another or attempted to cause the death under the
influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a
reasonable explanation or excuse.
defense.

This is an affirmative

Under the law of Utah, the State has the obligation

of disproving affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt.
This isn't a case where the Court has to say beyond a
reasonable doubt I can say there is extreme emotional
disturbance.

If the Court is unable to say beyond a reasonable

doubt that there is no extreme emotional disturbance for which
there is a reasonable excuse, then this section is applicable.
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And in terms of disproving that there is extreme emotional
distress for which there is a reasonable excuse, the State has
utterly failed to disprove that beyond a reasonable doubt.
Home invasion burglary, fighting, people getting
stabbed, people getting thrown through windows, people fleeing
from the place, there is a huge disturbance there.
interview Raul said repeatedly, I was afraid.
what was going to happen.

I didn ? t know

I didnf t know if they had guns.

know the PVCC f s like to shoot.
disturbance.

In his

That's an extreme emotional

Did Raul cause that?

No, the five home invaders

got everything rolling and things went wild from there.
murder is out of the question.

I

So

Extreme emotional disturbance,

at a minimum, would bring that down to manslaughter.
I would submit the wound, the location, that there is
only one, indicates only an intent to cause bodily injury.
There is no intent to cause something life threatening.

In the

ordinary course, absent these two extraordinary circumstances,
this wouldn T t be a life-threatening wound.
In sum, I would ask to find the Court to find Raul
Carrillo not guilty.

If the Court does find that he is

responsible, I would suggest that the maximum he is guilty of
is homicide by assault.
If there are no further questions, I will submit it.
MS. GEORGE:

Your Honor, I know that you have,

obviously, listened to the testimony and listened to argument.
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I would just ask the Court to key in on a couple of issues.
First of all, separate defendant, separate issues, separate
conduct alleged.

That ? s why you have two counsel.

So I would

ask the Court to look at what f s alleged against Alejandro
Carrillo specifically as to what's charged against him.

In

that situation I think the Court needs to look at what has not
been proven by the State.
I would ask the Court to consider the statute
76-5-206, negligent homicide, in the event that the Court is
not going to issue an acquittal, which is what I believe is
appropriate as to Alejandro Carrillo.

If the Court is not

going to go there, I would like the Court to look at 76-5-206,
and with that in the definitions of the criminal code there is
76-2-103 (4), which is the definition of criminal negligence.
Additionally, the statute right below that in the code book
talks about what the culpable mental state is.

And take that

into consideration when looking at the elements that I would
like to point out.
THE COURT:

Ms. George, what are the theoretical

options available to the Court?
MS. GEORGE:

In this situation, what the Court needs

to take into consideration is the testimony that was presented
to you.
THE COURT:

No, just legally, what are, in your view,

the theoretical options?
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MS. GEORGE:
THE COURT:

I believe the theoretical options

—

Clearly murder.

MS. GEORGE:

Which I don ! t believe is appropriate.

THE COURT:

I am not asking you to argue right now.

MS. GEORGE:

You have got homicide, homicide by

assault, you have got criminal negligence.

There is even, as I

flip through here, I see a bunch of them.
THE COURT:
MS. GEORGE:
to Alejandro.
negligence.

Do I have manslaughter?
I believe that is out of the question as

I think what you need to look at is the criminal
I would even point to 76-5-112, reckless

endangerment.
THE COURT:

Why would you say it is out of the

question with respect to Alejandro?
MS. GEORGE:

Because I think in order to get to

manslaughter and to get to murder you still have to have the
intentional conduct, you have to have the culpable mens rea of
that person to get to that person.

My concern with having the

Court make that leap from criminal negligence or reckless
endangerment to homicide or to manslaughter, where are you
going to find the culpable mens rea, the mental state from this
individual?

First of all, you have to find what he actually

handed was a knife.
Chelsea Stout.

You didn ! t hear that evidence come from

He handed him something.

THE COURT:

I didn't see it.

Let ! s just assume, for the sake of
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argument, that he hands a knife.

Isn f t that party liability?

Doesn ! t that establish party liability?
MS, GEORGE:

Not when you look at the context.

If

you consider what Mr. Heineman is arguing, which is you have
Tongans, and I am not trying to use racial slurs, I am using
what the witnesses said here, you have big Polynesians,
Tongans, these islanders fighting with the Mexicans, it is a
gang fight, that f s what it is.

You have Tongans there.

There

was also testimony that someone, in the interview of Raul, some
person came and pulled him back from the car.

You have got

Chelsea testifying that Tongans are kicking, punching,
assaulting her.

So you can't look at what's happening right

here in a vacuum.
THE COURT:

Your point is if you find he hands him a

knife, that's not sufficient for party liability.

There has to

be some mens rea connecting the knife to an anticipated
assault, aggravated assault, or attempted murder, murder of the
victim, versus using it potentially defensively during the
fight.
MS. GEORGE:

Absolutely.

What we are not looking at

is you have your "X" for Chelsea, your "X" for Daniel.

What

you are not taking into consideration or what I worry needs to
be taken into consideration is this isn't happening in a
vacuum.

You still have got people spilling out into the

street.

The fighting is still going on.

Cole is driving his
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vehicle to get away, he drives over Chelsea, or hits her with
the car.

You have got people still fighting.

The fight has

tumbled from the apartment with the broken windows, and the
people going at it from the apartment into the street.

You

have people jumping into cars trying to get out of there.

You

have got fighting still going on.
If you believe what Chelsea said about Tongans
pushing her down and kicking her and assaulting her and this is
all going on right here, then you have to understand that if
the Court is going to believe that this gentleman handed that
gentleman a knife, what's the intent, what's the purpose?
it just to stab the person in the car?
is going on?

Or is it for self-defense?

Is

Is that what he thinks
If you have five

Tongans and one Mexican at the door of the car, what's the
intent for handing him the knife?
There has been absolutely no testimony that words
were exchanged.

In fact, what Chelsea Stout testified to under

oath in this trial is no words were exchanged.
discussion between Alex and Raul.

Absolutely no

Alex is in the car.

She

testified he is in the car, and then he gets out of their car
and comes up and hands something, although she doesn't see what
it is.

She testified she didn't see.
THE COURT:

She says it is almost instantaneous.

She

doesn't see what the object is at first, but the object
immediately transforms itself into a butterfly knife.
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MS. GEORGE:

If the Court is familiar with a

butterfly knife, where is that?
jacket, his Levis?

Is that in his pocket, his

Where is the knife and how does she know

that's the object he hands him?

I will get into the

credibility of Chelsea Stout.
The issue is you have got to still find, as the trier
of fact, what his intent was.

Is it because he knows that he

is going to open the knife and stab Daniel Johnson?

Or is it

self-defense for the five Tongans who are beating up people
standing by the car?

What is he going to do with it?

Because

no words were exchanged.
And to point to the testimony of the medical
examiner, who has testified, as he stated, all over the state,
repeated trials, Dr. Grey said, you know, this is not an
immediate lethal injury.
out huge amounts of blood.

Those were his words.

It doesn f t put

It is a slowly, and I quote,

"slowly evolving problem" was his testimony.

If adequate care

is given -THE COURT:

Can the Court, can I, if I find it

appropriate, convict of a lesser-included nobody asks for?
MS. GEORGE:

I believe so.

I absolutely believe so.

Why can T t a jury acquit the jury nullification if an attorney
doesn't argue that?

You, as the finder of fact, with your

knowledge of the code, absolutely.
THE COURT:

All right.
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Mr. Heineman?
MR. HEINEMAN:

I believe the law says the Court is

only allowed to look at what is actually presented in terms of
requested instructions.

If a defendant decides to go all or

nothing, that's their choice.

I f m pretty sure that ! s what the

law is, as far as that goes.
MS. GEORGE:

Then we differ on that, because we are

not submitting instructions.

Does the Court have a statute in

mind?
THE COURT:

No.

MS. GEORGE:

Just asking.

I would point the Court back again to

Todd Grey, whose testimony was this was a partial transection
of an artery, and had the artery been severed there would have
been less loss of blood because it would have stretched and
essentially closed off.
student.
people.

You are not talking about a medical

You are not talking about someone who dissects
You are talking about an individual in a fight with

five very large Tongans, as described by Chelsea, huge men, one
of them whose hand completely covered her face, she described
how tall, how big, in this fight.

Where the knife wound comes

in is not a knife wound to the face, it is not a knife wound to
the neck, it is not a knife wound to the chest, it is 5 inches
above the knee.

5 inches above the knee.

And it becomes a

partial transection of an artery.
So where is the intent from that to this person
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I just don ! t think that any of that

handing him the knife?

evidence was presented to the Court, that the knowledge and the
intent is there.

If the Court looks at 76-2-104, which talks

about the culpable mental state and the higher mental states
included, again, I just don't think the Court gets there.

If

you go back to negligent homicide, it discusses that someone
acting with criminal negligence engages in that conduct.
Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the actor,
acting with criminal negligence, causes the death of another.
THE COURT:

What are the lesser includeds that you

are specifically asking the Court to consider?
MS. GEORGE:

I would ask the Court to consider the

negligent homicide statute, 76-5-206; and reckless
endangerment, 76-5-112.
disagree with that.

I know the State obviously is going to

But I think that touches on that.

THE COURT:
MS. GEORGE:

What about homicide by assault?
I would ask the Court to consider that

as well.
THE COURT:
MS. GEORGE:

What about manslaughter?
Your Honor, I would ask the Court not to

consider that in relation to my client, because I don't believe
it meets the elements for him.

I realize the State is asking

that, short of murder, that that's what the Court needs to
consider.
THE COURT:

Mr. Heineman, same question to you.
245

MR. HEINEMAN:

I believe the appropriate

considerations are the murder as charged, the manslaughter and
the homicide by assault.
And the State 1 s position?

THE COURT:

Murder as

charged?
MR. HALL:

And manslaughter.

The State does not

believe that homicide by assault or negligent homicide are
appropriately considered lesser-included offenses, because the
State believes that there has not been evidence to meet those
elements, which are required for the trier of fact to consider
a lesser-included offense.
MS. GEORGE:

Your Honor, I realize that we have gone

over the inconsistent statements, but in preservation of the
record I just want to touch on some quick points, in relation
to this, what the State has talked about is uncontroverted,
salient evidence.

I would ask the Court to look at that.

ThatT s what they are asking for.

They said to the Court, You

have seen uncontroverted, salient evidence.

The only

uncontroverted, salient evidence that came into this case at
all was the statement of Daniel Johnson.
When law enforcement officers get to the scene and he
is there and he is bleeding and they say, Who did this to you?
Who did this to you?

The big Polynesian stabbed me.

been partying all night long with these two.

He has

And if you listen

to the statements again, their families know each other.
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Polynesians, Mexicans.

They know who is a Polynesian and they

know who is a Mexican.

The only uncontroverted, salient

evidence was by the victim himself.

And who the Court is going

to find more believable, Daniel Johnson or Chelsea Stout, is
what f s at issue.
Chelsea Stout testified here under oath no discussion
between these two, didn ! t see what he handed him, all she sees
is that a knife is produced.

Then she says to the Court, Go

ahead and believe I am in the driveway, it is dark outside,
this car is parked under a street light, and I can see from the
driveway to the vehicle, and I can see through the vehicle to
where this melee is occurring right here.

So she is looking

from here through the car to the melee here.

ThatT s where she

supposedly sees this.
I asked her, who else climbed out that window with
you?

This fight is going on, these giant Tongans, Polynesians,

are breaking into the home, the glass is shattering.
climbed with you to escape this?
went out the front door.

Who

Your boyfriend is gone.

He

Who climbed out the window with you?

Nobody.

I grabbed the keys.

Nobody.

By myself.

Who got in the car with you?

But the day after this happened she is with this
homicide detective in the police station being interviewed and
she says there was Beverly and another girl, donf t remember her
name, and we together climb out the window, we escape, we get
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the keys, we climb through the window together, we hop in the
car, and they are in the back of the car.

But the State is

saying disregard the fact that two women have completely
disappeared from her story, two women have completely
disappeared.

Don't worry about that fact.

Don't worry about

the fact that she lied at the preliminary hearing, and they can
characterize it anyway they want.

She lied.

She said she

didn't use cocaine, Daniel didn't use cocaine.

She lied.

But,

oh, by the way, believe here today that she is telling the
truth about a blue-handled butterfly knife.

And somehow she

sees the handle on the butterfly knife through the vehicle, in
the dark, even though she didn't see what Alex handed to Raul.
The problem is you can't just take it in a vacuum.
You have to assess her credibility.
have to assess her believability.

You, as the trier of fact,
And I put to the Court if

you stand Chelsea Stout up and her statement, it just isn't
going to pass muster.

That isn't uncontroverted evidence.

That's a young, 16-year-old girl, who has been
boozing it up all night, drinking shots, doing cocaine, been up
for hours, because by now it is 5:00 in the morning, so she
hasn't been asleep, partying all night long with these guys.
And if you believe what she says about being knocked
unconscious, whether it is at the front door when she is hit
initially when the Tongans come through the door, whether it is
knocked unconscious at the car by Raul where she claims she is
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assaulted, or knocked unconscious by the Tongans when they beat
her down, or when she is hit by the vehicle with Cole, the fact
is her story has changed six times.
And interesting was when I asked Detective Parks,
what T s the purpose of the victim's witness statement, which the
Court has as an exhibit?

And he said it is a serious crime,

and you want their memory fresh.

You want a fresh recollection

of what happened there, so hand them this statement and they
fill it out.
the stabbing.
come.

If the Court meets that, she doesn't even mention
Doesn't even mention it.

And she testified cops

She tells them, I have been beat up by the Tongans, all

these things occurred, but she fails to mention my fiance, my
boyfriend, he was stabbed and he is driving off.
tells the police that Daniel was stabbed.

Never even

None of this comes

up, none of the King Joker stuff, the stabbing, I believe it
was these people comes up until after she finds out Daniel is
dead.
THE COURT:

Maybe doesn't that explain why she

doesn't know what has happened to him, she doesn't know he is
dead, so why mention -MS. GEORGE:

I don't know, if I saw my fiance being

stabbed repeatedly by somebody, and the cops came up and are
trying to render aid, I think I would say my boyfriend was
stabbed repeatedly.

Oh, my God, he is gone, go find him.

doesn't even mention that.

She

And the curiosity is she does
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mention the day after to the homicide detective, Okay, he is
stabbed, and it is King Joker, and I think his name is Gabriel.
THE COURT:

She knows he is dead at that point in

time.
MS. GEORGE:
catch the killer.

Now she knows he is dead.

Now I have to

Now I have to tell the homicide detective

enough facts to get the person who killed my fiance.
she tell him?

What does

I crawled out the bedroom window with Beverly

and the other girl.

Daniel is hiding up on the carport.

It is

this person named King Joker, I think his real name is Gabriel,
and she describes the clothing in detail.
But what she describes varies from what she told the
officer the night before, as far as clothing descriptions, who
was there and what occurred.
descriptions.

Even then you have got differing

If what she is telling him is so important,

because that T s to catch him, why then at the preliminary
hearing does she differ yet again?

Why then from the

preliminary hearing to trial does she differ yet again?

And I

am just asking the Court to consider, why drop out Beverly and
the other woman when you are escaping from this horrible fight
and melee?

Where did they go?
And she is adamant in her testimony, what she is

saying to the Court is, I assume.

When I asked, you said he

was stabbed multiple times, then you say he is stabbed once,
well, I assumed he was.

If what you are looking at is the
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alcohol, the drugs and a young, scared, frightened 16-year-old
girl who is upset, you can f t find this man guilty based on her
assumptions.

She assumes it was a knife.

handed him a knife.
doubt.

She assumes he

That isn't sufficient for reasonable

And when you try it before a jury you ask repeatedly

for the jury to remember what the burden of proof is and it is
the reasonable doubt.
Is a young, coked-up, drunk, 16-year-old girl who is
frightened, assumptions that vary on some details, is that
still sufficient reasonable doubt that he had a knife and that
he handed that knife to his brother?

I submit to the Court

that it isn f t sufficient.
And again to look at the medical examiner's testimony
discussing what occurred.

I would also ask the Court to look

at the fact that you have got 35 fingerprints, you have got DNA
samples, blood samples, you have got all kinds of physical
evidence that was collected by the homicide detective, and not
one piece came back, not one piece, not one bloodstain, not one
palm print, not one fingerprint came back to either of the
Carrillo brothers, not one thing.

And we don't know what comes

back to any of the Tongans, the four large Tongans and Justin
Shelton who were there, because they weren T t even tested.

They

weren't even tested.
I would ask again, as I said, for the Court to look
at the fact that in order to satisfy the statutes that the
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State is putting up before the Court you have got to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that somehow the mens rea with my
client, Alejandro Carrillo, was there, and I just don't think
it is with their statutes.
Does the Court have any other questions?
THE COURT:

No.

Mr. Hall?
MR. HALL:

Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, may it

please the Court, may I, let me address Ms. George's statements
first, because they are the most recent and maybe fresh in our
minds.

Your Honor, not all memories are equal.

When someone

is remembering what the name of the person was who went out the
back door, how many people are in the car, that's different
from the memory who killed your boyfriend.
In fact, I would expect a witness who is telling the
truth and remembering accurately from a long time ago to be
clear on some things and less clear on others.

Because if she

were 100 percent on everything, I would suspect somebody got
ahold of her and gave her the transcript and let her read all
of the stuff and here you go.
So, frankly, your Honor, I think the fact that she at
one point remembered someone in the car and now doesn't, but is
real clear on who killed her boyfriend and who was there when
the knife was handed to the boyfriend
THE COURT:

—

What about the fact she admitted she
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perjured herself at the preliminary hearing?
MR. HALL:

On the elements in which she was

dishonest, they were elements that dealt with things that she
found embarrassing.
drinking.

She had been using drugs.

She had been

Things that she didn T t want to admit at the time.

And we elicited there, and I said, Well, that wasn't entirely
true, was it?
either.

And she said, Well, it wasn't completely false,

And maybe of greater importance, I f m not sure, when I

asked her to clarify that, the only relevance of drinking and
having drugs would be her ability to perceive the events
accurately and to remember them.
THE COURT:

Would you, in all candor, absent the

interview with Raul Carrillo, be standing before me suggesting
that the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt establishes the
defendants are guilty of murder here?
MR. HALL:

It is a difficult hypothetical question

for me to answer.
THE COURT:
MR. HALL:

That's why I asked it, Mr. Hall.
Because it requires me to analyze, really,

the totality of the evidence absent a critical piece of
evidence.
THE COURT:

That's right.

It really asks you to

focus in on the testimony of an individual witness, who,
candidly, has been inconsistent on a number of important
events.
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MR. HALL:

And I concede that, your Honor.

THE COURT:

And would you truly be standing up here

at this time with that in mind, given everything else,
suggesting, absent the interview, that there is proof beyond a
reasonable doubt?
MR. HALL:

Well, again, for me to answer that

question, I would really have to think through it more than -You can punt if you want to, thatfs fine.

THE COURT:
MR. HALL:

The two seconds I have got to really go

through the analysis.

Because as I indicated the proof beyond

a reasonable doubt is the sum total of all the evidence that we
presented to the Court.
THE COURT:
MR. HALL:
THE COURT:
party liability?

So forgive me

—

I will accept the punt.
Very well.
What about the mens rea requirement for

Would you agree, let's say that the knife was

handed, the Court finds the knife was handed by Alejandro
Carrillo to Raul Carrillo ten minutes before any stabbing took
place.
MR. HALL:

And I think that there is a sufficient

separation, I think the connection would be so tenuous that
there wouldn ! t be party liability.
THE COURT:

For party liability to exist, in the

State's view, what does the defendantfs motive have to be?
MR. HALL:

It has to be the same as the actor for
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whom we are ascribing the liability.

And I think that is

clearly proved in this case, and I will tell you why.
Ms. George suggested to you that you shouldn't evaluate this
diagram and this evidence in a vacuum, which is true.

But I

disagree with her recollection of the testimony at the time.
The Court will review it and the Court will use its own
recollection of evidence presented to it.

As I recall the

testimony there were not Tongans, five or any number of Tongans
anywhere near this vehicle when Chelsea and the defendants and
the victim were present.

In fact, the testimony was that as

Raul, the stabber, was walking away, there were words, and he
returned to the vehicle, and then a fight ensued.
THE COURT:

Doesn't Chelsea in her statement say that

the Polynesians were there, in fact identify them as the people
that knocked her unconscious outside the vehicle and kicked
her?
MR. HALL:
THE COURT:
MR. HALL:

No.
Take a look at the statement, Mr. Hall.
My recollection is she believed there was

somebody else, because she knew there was more than one person.
THE COURT:

Read the statement.

Doesn't she

expressly say it was the Polynesians that beat her outside of
the vehicle?
MR. HALL:
THE COURT:

Is the Court referring to this statement?
Yes.
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MR. HALL:

No, your Honor.

The statement says, "We

were sitting there with a Tongan or Samoan and he left because
his ride was here and then they came back in and started
fighting, and when they all came in they started fighting and
beat me up."

That ! s the end of the statement.

Doesn't say

anything about a vehicle or Raul or Alejandro or anything else.
I don't believe this statement has anything to do with the
stabbing at the vehicle at all.

I believe this statement is

only speaking to the initial entry into the apartment by the
Tongans, the melee that goes on in the apartment.
THE COURT:

She isn't referring to being beaten up by

them outside of the car?
MR. HALL:

No, I don't believe that's what the

statement pertains to at all.
So the Court now must consider, and the Court will
remember the instruction that we give to juries, that the proof
of intent is rarely susceptible to proof by direct evidence.
And we know that.

That's our trade, is inferring intent from

the conduct that's going on here.

The conduct that the

testimony described was a fight between defendant Raul and
Daniel Johnson, and Alejandro handing something, and
immediately thereafter the knife comes out and Daniel is
stabbed.
There is no evidence of self-defense.

There is no

suggestion that maybe Alejandro was handing the knife to Raul
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to defend himself.

All we know it was a fistfight.

And there

is simply no evidence to suggest anything other than a common
or a similar intent, and the only intent that we need to
develop for party liability and I submit for murder is this
basic intent of taking a knife blade, at least 8.5 centimeters,
and plunging it into Daniel Johnson's leg.
The knife wasn't there to show somebody and say get
back.

The knife wasn? t there to show them I have a neat knife.

The knife wasn't there for a hypothetical ridiculous purpose.
The knife was there to cause damage to Daniel Johnson.

That's

why Alejandro handed it to Raul, and thatTs why Raul
immediately thereafter thrusted it into the leg of Daniel
Johnson.

I think that the Court ought to find that they are

yoked together, mens rea, with the intent, such that party
liability is established.
Your Honor, I don't know to what extent —
discussed the credibility of Chelsea.
remark undone.

we have

I can't leave the one

I appreciate I am not arguing to a jury, I am

arguing to the Court, but to characterize Chelsea as a young,
coked-up, drunk, 16-year-old, aside from being offensive, I
think fundamentally misrepresents the testimony.

I asked her

and she testified about the effects of the alcohol and the drug
on her, and she remembered and testified to details clearly,
and has, Ms. George suggests to you, changed her story six
times, but she has never changed her story who killed her
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boyfriend, and she has never changed her story who was there,
who handed an object to the killer of her boyfriend.
times, five, four, three, two, one, never.

Not six

She has never

changed her story on the most important point.

And I think the

Court will appreciate, as I began, that not all memories are
equal.

We would expect her to remember better those who were

responsible for her boyfriend ! s death, and the circumstances
surrounding those.
Your Honor, I invite additional questions the Court
might have, because I would like to move on
THE COURT:
MR. HALL:

—

No, move on.
—

to Mr. Heineman!s points.

As I

mentioned, the failure to get first aid, that's not a defense.
It is not an element of anything.
relevant.

Frankly, I don't think it is

Mr. Heineman suggested to the Court more than once

that he didn't have an intent to kill, which we have never
argued, and we discussed that.
I think Mr. Heineman raised an interesting point
about the confession.

And while the confession was being

played I made a note of the same line that the Court did.

It

was almost made as a passing remark, which I think gives it
even greater weight and credibility.

And what's telling is

Raul's statement repeatedly that, I don't remember the knife.
He remembers and admits to everything else, but he doesn't
remember the knife.

I can't comment on people who invoke the
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privilege against self incrimination.
THE COURT:
MR. HALL:

Nor should you.
Nor will I.

But when they talk, I can

comment on that, and what they say and what they don't say I
think is very telling, and what rings in my mind is, I don't
remember the knife.
remember.
truth.

Not, I didn't do it.

It was, I don't

And as the interview progressed we got closer to the

It started out from, I don't know what you are talking

about, to, I don't remember it, to a casual comment that the
Court has already picked up on and one that I put a star by as
we were going by, which I think is a very telling and powerful
and convincing admission that Raul stabbed Daniel Johnson.
A couple of points, and then I will conclude.

As the

Court knows, reckless conduct is when one is aware, but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustified risk, and
it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care.

I

think the Court would not be inappropriate to consider and
apply that standard to the conduct of these defendants.

I, as

I did before, would suggest that it rises beyond that, and
their conduct qualifies as murder, as the legislature has seen
fit to define murder.

To engage in conduct with a depraved

indifference to human life, a person must do more than act
recklessly, but he need not have as his conscious objective or
desire to cause the result, nor need he be aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
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We heard talk about medical students, military
trained people.
anatomy.

You don't require someone to know human

We don f t hold to different standards different

knowledge, background, experience of people.

What I believe we

say is that when you not cut or lacerate or scrape or scratch
but plunge a knife 8.5 centimeters into someonef s leg and cause
that kind of a hole, out from which they bleed to death, and do
nothing, that exhibits a depraved indifference to human life.
And I just do not see any other intent than one to cause
serious bodily injury to another when they plunge a knife 8.5
centimeters into the body of another person.
Your Honor, Mr. Harms began this trial talking about
choices and accountability, and the law holds people
accountable for their choices, and the law tells us the degree
to which people must be held accountable for their choices.

No

one set out or hoped or believed that any of this would result
in the tragic death of Daniel Johnson.

But the conduct clearly

occurred by these two defendants, and they must be held
accountable for their actions, and justice requires this Court
to consider the facts and apply the law, and we ask this Court
to find the defendants guilty.
Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT:

We will adjourn for the time being.

I

want to see counsel in chambers for just a few minutes.
(These proceedings were adjourned at 11:24 AM)
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Addendum D

DET. CORDON PARKS INTERVIEW WITH RAUL CARILLO
PRESENT ALSO DET. SIEBENECK, HOMICIDE SQUAD
DATE: 9/20/04
TIME:
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED INFORMATION

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

CP:
RC:

How do you spell your first name?
RAUL.

CP:
RC:

Middle name?
Roberto

CP:
RC:

Last name?
CARILLO

CP:
RC:

What's your birthdate?
9-29-82.

CP:
RC:

What is your address?
It's 1020 West 700 South.

CP:
RC:

What is your zip code?
84104

CP:
RC:

Who else lives there?
My grandma and my mother.

CP:
RC:

So it's your mom's house?
No, it's my grandma's house, me and my mom live there.

CP:
RC:

What's the phone number there?
328-4094

CP:
RC:

Do you have a cell phone?
No.

CP:
RC:

No. Do you have a work phone?
No. Look up at me partner.

CP:

RC:

Can you do me a favor? Don't call me that, seriously.
Look at the camera Do me a favor, pull your hair back like that. Side to side.
Other side. Ok thanks
You get one more and you're tapped huh?

CP:
RC:

Perfect thank you. Do you know why you are here?
No. I don't.
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43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

CP:
RC:

Did you go to a party on Windsor Circle on Friday night?
Where would that be at?

CP:
RC:

2700 South and 8th East?
Yea I did.

CP:

Well everybody, something bad happened at that party ok and we are
Talking to everybody that was there. Actually nobody stayed around to
Talk to us everybody like left so, but anyway there was a lot of bad
Stuff, a lot of people got punched, stabbed, the Tongans broke in they got
Arrested, [t was a big melee and a big deal, ok. But everybody there is a
Possible suspect alright? So anyway, before we proceed I am going to read
You your rights just so you know that you really don't have to talk to us if
You don't want to.
You have the right to remain silent, anything you say
Can and will be used against you in a court of law - do you understand that?
Yes, sir.

RC:
CP:
RC:
CP:
RC:
CP:

You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while
You are being questioned, do you understand that?
Yes, sir.
Ok. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer one will be appointed to represent
You before any questioning if you wish - do you understand that?
Yes, sir.

RC:

You can decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer any questions
Or make any statements.
Yes, sir.

CP:
RC:

Having your rights in mind will you talk to us and answer our questions?
Yes, sir, I've got nothing to hide.

CP:
RC:

Ok, it's 14:08. Tell us about the party, what happened and what you saw?
Well, we was there, I was there with some girls. Well, we were at another
Party and some girls said that they knew of somewhere else to party at.
(phone rings - C.Parks)

CP:
??:

They are at the back door.
Who?
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85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
Ill
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

CP:
??:

Julie.
Ok.

CP:

Will you go? I think the robbery room's set up. Alright, you went
To one party ...
Yea, we went to one party and some girls said that they know where another
Party was so we followed them up clear up there and

RC:

CP:
RC:

They took you to another party?
Yea, they took us to that apartment, duplex, whatever it was over there.
And we were sitting there drinking and...

CP:

Wait, stop. I lag behind because I can't write that fast. Who were the
Girls?
I can't remember the names, they were just some girls we met up at one of the
Parties. They just wanted to kick it with us.

RC:

CP:
RC:

So you drove yourselves?
Yea, I drove in my car. We drove up there.

CP:
RC:

Which car is yours?
It's an 82 Cutlass, t-top.

CP:
RC:

Ok, who was with you?
It was me and my little brother and then there was two other guys that was
With those girls. We just gave them a ride up there.

CP:
RC:

Your little brother, is that Alex?
Yea, Alexandra Carillo.

CP:
RC:

And the two girls, you don't know their names?
No, there was two other guys with us. I don't know who they were. They
Just needed a ride because one of their cars, the girl's car wouldn't go.

CP:
RC:

My goodness, how many people made this trip in these two cars?
There was four in my car and five or six girls in the other car.

CP:
RC:

Do you know any of those girls or their names?
I think one was Stephanie and another was Jessica, or something like that.

CP:
RC:

Any idea how I can find them and talk to them?
I don't know, we just met them at the party. That was the first time we ever
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127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168

Were meeting them.

CP:

Ok, go ahead.

RC:

And then we were up at the party and one of the girls started acting up because
I wasn't showing favor to one of them and the one of them that was acting up
Liked me and so they left and so we sat there and just kicked back there for a
Second longer trying to find some other girl to kick it with and then some guys
Came up in there and started acting all crazy. One of them started fighting with
The guy that lived there, I think his name was Simon, started fighting with the
Guy that lived there and then they kept asking if we were Tongans or, yea, they
kept asking if we were Tongans and one of them walked up to my, the one that
Got in a fight with that guy, Simon, ran up to my brother's face and started trying
To get crazy with him and then he hit him and then all I remember is just
Everybody was throwing fists, fighting all the way out. Just fighting and there
Was three of them on me that was beating me up. There was three fighting, I was
Fighting three of them and then I was like starting to see everybody push outside
And then there was some of us outside still fighting and then windows were
getting broken and all that stuff was going on. And then we went inside, I went
Inside because I couldn't see my little brother and I went inside to see if he was
There and then when I was leaving I got in a fight with two other guys in a black
Car. Two guys and three girls I think was in the car.

CP:
RC:

And where was that fight happening?
That fight was happening outside. You walk like from outside the apartment
You walk straight and it was like, I remember the street went like that and then
There was more of the apartments, but it happened like straight in front of the
Door.

CP:
RC:

Straight in front of the door?
Yea, the door where we were partying at. Just right up straight up.

CP:
RC:

Ever see these guys before?
I've seen one of them.

CP:

That is a bad question, let me back up.

The guys that originally started fighting

inside

RC:

The apartment?
Like the guys, like the Samoans or?

CP:
RC:

Yes. That was my question. Are they like Tongan's, Samoans, Islanders?
I think they were Samoans, they were saying something about Park Village and
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That's all I know is that a part of Park Village is Samoans.
But they started the fight inside the apartment?
Yea. They forced their way up in there.
That's what I am getting at. They had to break into the apailment to start
The fight?
I don't know. I was in the kitchen, the apartment goes like that and there's
A you walk in the front door and there's like couches here and couches here
And a entertainment center and then it goes like straight and I know there's
A bathroom right there because I had to go to the bathroom. There's a kitchen
Area, the kitchen goes back. I was over here, my little brother and I were sitting
Over here talking and then all of a sudden we just seen somebody fighting. We
Seen two people's backs and then I finally realized it was the guy that owned the
house that was fighting. He was fighting one of the Samoans that was there.
And that was Simon who was defending his house that you saw fighting?
Yes.
Fighting an islander kind of guy?
Yea, Polynesian everyone called him..
I think the correct term is Islander.
Islander? And then got in a fight. I got in a fight with another guy outside
And we ...
This guy you got in a fight with outside, describe him to me?
Describe him?
Yes.
He was bald head, he was like a little bit shorter than me, he was skinnier
Than I was.
Was he a white guy?
No, he was a Mexican.
How tall was he do you think?
Probably like about 5'7.
How much did he weigh do you think?
I weigh 200 so he was way skinnier than I was so he was probably about
Roughly, I don't know I don't want to kind of guess at that
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211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252

CP:
RC:

Ok, so just how was he built? Fat or thin or?
Man, he was skinny. Skinnier than I was.

CP:

Why were you fighting him?

RC:

I don't know, going outside all the commotion and stuff going on, and someone
Says something and I turn around an "whoa, who the fuck are you guys?" and
The guy hit me. He said "don't disrespect me". And I was like "fuck you" so we
Just started fighting.

CP:
RC:

He hit you first?
Yea, he hit me and we just started fighting. And then after we started fighting
He started getting me good and I just backed off and then I walked around his
Car.

CP:
RC:

Was he in a car?
Yea, he was in a car.

CP:
RC:

What kind of car?
I don't know. It was a black car.

CP:

RC:

I want you to do something for me. This is the duplex, or four plex.
I guess actually because there's two apartments up. And this is the circle
Or the street right here. Draw in where the fight happened outside in the
Front.
Ok, this is the duplex so the door would be right about here, huh?

CP:
RC:

Yea.
It was just straight up.

CP:
RC:

Where was the guy's car parked at?
There was several cars in the street trying to leave. And it was like the
Back car.

CP:
RC:

No, let's say this was the street. Ok?
Now you got me confused.

CP:

Ok, this is the front lawn. This is the side lawn, that's the curb. That's
The driveway that goes around to the parking lot OK?
Right up. Where's the street at?

RC:
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253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293

CP:
RC:

The street's right here.
It was about right here that we fought. It was just like right in front of the
Door because I remember like the guys were outside like because we were
fighting. There was a lot of dudes that was there that we were fighting and
I just fought straight out the door and then into the street. And then like
everybody started scattering and then some guys started talking some shit and
then that's why I got in a fight with him.

CP:
RC:

Where was his car parked at?
His car wasn't parked, they were in the, they were trying to drive out. Everybody
Was trying to drive out of the street. Out onto that one main street, what's that
Street right here?

CP:
RC:

The main street would be here, 2700 South. Down here. So you can't tell me
Where his car was?
I don't know where his car was parked at.

CP:
RC:

Ok. And I think you said he had another guy and three girls in the car?
Yea, there was a guy and three girls in the car.

CP:
RC:

Do you know any one of those people?
No, I didn't know who they were. There was just so much confrontation
Everybody was just tripping trying to figure out who was who and where
Was everybody (??)

CP:

Ok, somebody got stabbed. Well, actually a lot of people got stabbed at that
Party. The Tongans that broke in, they all got stabbed. Do you know who
Stabbed them?
I don't. There was just so much commotion going on I didn't, I probably even
Hit a couple of my friends that was there too.

RC:
CP:
RC:

Just out of the general confusion?
Yea, there was just a big old rumble just going on right there. Just everybody
Was swinging. I even got hit in the head with a bottle. Pretty hectic. Big old
Rumble. And then people started pushing out towards the out of the house too
And everything.

CP:
RC:

Ok, did you see anybody stabbing the Tongans?
I didn't see nothing.

CP:

How about your brother?
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294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335

RC:

My brother? I just seen him get hit first. I seen him get hit and then I just seen
him start swinging and then some other guy tried to run up on him and I hit him
And then I hit him and that dude stumbled back and two ran up on him. And I
Kind of ducked down like that and I took a lot of hits to the head, got scratches.

CP:

And all this is going on outside?

RC:

No, this went on inside that house. And then everybody started, there was like
A big old fight like I kind of slipped out. I slipped out of those guys and went
Behind some other dude that was there and then I just seen everybody fighting
And I seen my brother's shirt and so I just started running up and punching
And then we just all went out to the street.

CP:

Ok. I think it was during the fight in the front yard that somebody got stabbed
Really badly and they wound up dying. Did you see anybody get stabbed in the
Front yard?
I didn't see nobody get stabbed. I still was fighting. The fighting was going on
And I was just worried about who was in front of me and trying to keep my own
So I wouldn't get beat up. Because there was bottles flying, people getting hit
With bottles and everything and I was just trying to get out of there as safe as
Possible.

RC:

CP:
RC:

So how did you get out?
How did I get out?

CP:
RC:

Yes.
Forced my way out fighting.

CP:

But how did you get away from the scene because you were like gone when
The police got there?
Oh no, I didn't. At first we left everybody got out of the way, some guy hit a
Some guy was in a car and ran over another car and hit another car and then he
Drove off and he got, we were right behind him and I jumped in my car and
turned and we went and turned right and we went down the street a little bit and
I realized I'd lost my necklace and so we came back around. I was there when
The officer was there. I told him, me and my brother told him we came back to
Get my necklace because I'd lost my necklace and so we found my necklace and
We left.

RC:

CP:
RC:

So you talked to the cop?
Yea, the cop was like "what are you doing here" and I said I lost my necklace
Over here and my brother got out and found it and I turned around because I
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Remember like the street was a circle type and I turned around and I came back
Around and then we got in the car and we just drove off.

RC:

That car that ran into the other car on the circle, did you see who was in that
car?
Oh no, I just know there was one guy that was in there.

CP:
RC:

Just one guy?
Yea, there was a guy that was in there.

CP:
RC:

What kind of car was it that hit the other cars then?
I'm trying to think. I think it was a green colored car. It looked like it
Could have been like a Honda Civic or something like that.

CP:

Well, I am very interested in the fight that happened out front because
It was outside in the front where this guy was stabbed. He was stabbed
In the leg, a dumb place to get stabbed, but what happened was the stab
Wound nicked an artery and the guy instead of stopping and like bandaging
up his leg, applying a tourniquet or something he tried to drive home and
He bled to death is what happened. It was a stupid thing. He didn't need to
die but he did. Ok, and whoever stabbed him I'm sure didn't intend to kill
Him. It was just an unfortunate thing, almost like an accident ok? So do
You know who that person was that stabbed him?
No I don't. It was so much confrontation and commotion and I didn't have
My eyes everywhere just in front of me trying to get up out of there.

CP:

RC:

CP:
RC:
CP:
RC:

Ok. Well there were a lot of people that actually did witness the stabbing
Because there was a lot of people that was there and they told us who did it
And it was you.
Who me?
It was you. You didn't mean to kill him, but you did stab him in the leg and
We have eye witnesses that saw you stab him in the leg and there you go.
I mean you didn't mean to do it, but it happened.
For real?

RC:

For real. You didn't mean to but you did and you've been given up and that's
Why we sent AP&P out to get you.
So Someone died?

CP:

Yes. The kid you stabbed in the leg he bled to death

CP:
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I didn't have no knife or nothing, I didn't.
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CP:

No, let me tell you how you had a knife. Your brother Alex handed you the
Knife and then you stabbed him with the knife that Alex handed you. Ok?
You were seen doing it. I mean, you think back in your own memory about
How many people were out front and how many people were in the car watching
What happened and you just did it and that's why you're here talking to me.
Now, I want to impress upon you, no shit, you didn't mean for it to happen ok,

RC:

But it did. And what you are charged with now is going to depend a lot
Upon how honest you are right now, ok?
I didn't have no knife, sir, I'm being honest. I didn't....

RC:

You had it and you stabbed him. You were seen doing it. Don't tell me
You didn't do it because you have been identified.
I'm not trying to lie to fuck you on. I know you guys think I did it but

CP:
RC:

No, we know you did it. Do you know how we know you did it?
How?

CP:

Because of your hair and your joker tattoo on your forearm. That's how
Much you have been identified. You did it, ok? You did it. Why do
You think you're here? You did it, you were seen, you've been given up.
And not only that but you told people about it, ok?
I don't talk to nobody I didn't have no knife, all I was doing was figliting
Trying to get my way out of there. I honestly don't remember having a
Knife. I don't.

CP:

RC:

CP:
RC:

But you remember being in a fight in the front yard right?
I remember fighting, yea.

CP:

Well, the kid's car was a very dark dark green car that looked like a black
Car that had two girls, actually had three girls in it. So that sounds like the
Guy that you were fighting in the front yard with and the stabbing victim.
That's what it sounds like to me.
(crying)

RC:

RC:

Now listen, this doesn't have to be the most terrible awful thing in your
whole life, ok?
I've never killed nobody man.

CP:

Well, you never killed nobody before and you didn't mean to do it, ok?

CP:
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We have the witnesses that say what you did. You ran over and stabbed
Him when he was in the front seat of his car and you only stabbed him in

RC:
CP:

RC:
CP:
RC:

CP:

RC:

The leg. You didn't mean to do it, ok? But you know you don't want to go
down here saying you didn't do it because everybody is going to get on the
Stand and say you did.
Yea?
And you are going to look like a fool on the stand. (No, Come on in - Det.
Siebeneck enters room) And you're going to look like a fool on the stand
because we are going to put on all these people that were there at the sight and the
people that were in the car
We are going to put on all the people that saw you do it and then you're going to
get up on the stand and say you didn't do it and you are going to look like a total
fool.
I don't remember, honestly I just don't remember it.
Well, I told you all about it and how it happened. Yea, you remember because
You told somebody about it afterwards.
I didn't talk to nobody about it, I don't remember having the knife or nothing on
me. You know I'm not going to sit here and try to bullshit you guys, you got
witnesses and I know that's going to fuck me but I honestly in my mind...
Now, let me tell you something. You've been through the system a couple of
times right? You know that the law loves people that like take responsibility
for their actions, right? You can go down saying I didn't do it, I didn't do it,
I didn't do it. And you are going to get screwed in the end because the judge is
going to say "you know, this guy's just not getting it and not taking
responsibility". But if you tell your side of the story "yea, there was a big fight
and I got hit and I lost and yea, I had a knife and I stabbed him in the leg. Jesus
I didn't intend to kill him but it was a bad accident." If you go down saying that
story it's going to go a lot better for you. Because that's the truth.
Yea, I want to, I honestly there's so much commotion, there's I honestly don't
remember. You know what I'm saying? I'm not going to sit here and call you a
liar or the witnesses a liar, apparently they seen me but...

CP:
RC:

How can you not remember?
There's was just so much going on.

CP:
RC:

That's not a good story either, you don't think you can get away with that?
I know, but I'm being as truthful as I am. All my other stuff I've been
fucked around with, you know what I'm saying, I've been truthful about it
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In all my cases that I've been fucked with. And honestly I don't remember
stabbing him, if I do remember stabbing him I would admit to it because
Apparently there's witnesses.
CP:
RC:
CP:
RC:
CP:

RC:
CP:

Well, there's another problem here I want you to consider ok, and that's your
brother Alex. Do you like Alex?
That's my little brother. I love the hell out of him.
Witnesses saw him hand you the knife and do you know what that means for
Alex?
Accessory?
In Utah it's called "parties". It means he's a party to the offense and he's going
Down for murder also, that's what it means, ok? Somebody's got to take "
responsibility and if you guys are going to sit here and say "we didn't do it, we
didn't do it, we don't remember we don't remember" then that's it. We've got
To take the hard stance. You are forcing us into a corner here you know.
Well if that's that then, if they seen me stab him then it was me that did it then.

RC:

Ok, well we're getting somewhere but that's a little shy of really taking
responsibility. Ok? Now look, Vic and I have talked to a lot of people. You
are not the first guy that we've had to talk to like this and I know it's horrible
and I know that you are scared, and Jesus I know you're frightened. You've
Got to be scared shitless right now.
Fuck, I've never killed nobody, that fucking makes me feel bad.

CP:
RC:

Did you intend to kill him this time?
I didn't, all I was fighting, I was just trying to get out of there.

CP:
RC:

You've got to be truthful, tell me your story?
I am being truthful...

CP:
RC:

Tell me your side of the events, tell me what happened?
I was.We were up in the house, some people forced their way in, we fought.
I went outside, you know what I am saying, we fought and we went outside.
There was some other, there was, I seen two dudes and three girls that was in the
car , in a dark car, and we started fighting and one of the dudes said something to
me and he hit me and we started fighting and that's all I remember is just fighting.

CP:

Well that's not going to be good enough. Let me refresh your memory. He was
sitting in his own car when it happened ok?
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RC:

That's where I got hit ok, I got hit and we started fighting and he got out. We
Started fighting.

CP:

RC:

Yea, but he got back inside his own car. Look, I'm not supposed to give you
all the details of the crime. We know all the details of what happened, ok?
But you are supposed to tell me, I'm not supposed to tell you alright? You want
To help yourself out and especially do you want to help your brother out let's
hear the truth. (Phone ringing in background)
I told you the truth.

CP:
RC:

You do know he's here don't you?
Who?

CP:
RC:

Your brother?
Yea, he was....

CP:

Your brother is here and I've already talked to him somewhat on this and I
need to wait for him, he's the case agent on this and we got to a really critical
point he and I and I need for him to come in with me so we can finish our talk...
He's not having a problem keeping his mouth shut, ok? So what we are trymg
to do is give you the option here, the ability to kind of mitigate some of your...
You know like he said, the law likes it when people take responsibility for their
actions. The courts definitely look favorably upon them. Don't make us go the
hard road and you
I'm not. Because I know it's going to fuck me in the long run you know

VS:

RC:
VS:
RC:

Definitely.
If I did stab him, you know what I am saying? If I did stab him you know what
I am saying I want to, I know it probably would have been an accident or
something. I honestly don't remember.

CP:

Ok, let's be crystal clear and focus on this ok? The law focuses on intent, what
Was going through your mind at the moment that it happened ok? And right now
it looks like fairly premeditated murder ok? And the reason it looks like that ok
is that someone, your brother, handed you the knife and you had to open up his
car door so that proves prior intent. So that's murder, that's like aggravated
murder you know. The jury is going to say he had the knife in his hand, he
opened the door, he clearly intended to kill this guy. And what we want out
of you is we want the intent of what was going through your mind at the time
because of where he was stabbed, you know, that tell's us that you didn't intend
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To kill him. But you are dancing around the whole issue here.

RC:

I'm not. If the people seen me, if this people seen me then they would ....

CP:
RC:

They did see you do it. They saw you, I told you they saw you.
I know but the thing is...

CP:
RC:

In fact I described to you how you did it, what more do you want me to tell you?
You did it, I want you to admit it.
Did they say they seen us fighting was there both swinging?

CP:

Yes, that's why we are trying to go around like this, we are frying to get your

intent

RC:

In your mind of what you did or what you were thinking at the moment that you
did it because it's going to have a tremendous effect on your future and what you
are charged with. You know you are going to be charged, you are going from
here to jail. But are you going to go to jail for first degree murder for the rest
of your life or are you going to go for manslaughter which is like a couple of
Years you know? That's what we are getting at here. And you axe dancing
around the issues here and you are...
WelUjLypu gays-^o^mcrTTSo^you got people"5

C B ^ It's not "if, we got you ok?
RC: I know you guys got me and there's the witnesses saying they seen it you know
So why am I gojingJiLsiUi^e and bullshit you and say that I did it or I didn't do
t2_

RC:

We want you to tell us what you did and why? And we want to hear it out of
your own lips because we don't know what your intent was when you did it.
We want to hear what you was thinking?
I was just fighting, trying to get up out of there

CP:
RC:

What were you thinking when you opened the car door?
I got hit in my mouth, what I was thinking was hitting the guy back.

CP:
RC:

So you did open the car door, right?
Yea.

CP:

Ok, and what were you thinking when you opened the car door? What were
You going to do?
I was going to hit the guy back for hitting me.

CP:

RC:
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CP:

Ok, and the knife in your hand.. .why didn't you just hit him with your fist
Instead of stabbing him?

RC:

Honestly, I'm drawing a blank there.

CP:
RC:

Were you like wild, out of control? Angry? What?
I was scared. There was a whole bunch of shit going on. I didn't know,
I know how those gangsters, I know how gangsters are saying there's guns,
everything, you know what I am saying so I was Just trying to get out of there as
safe as possible.

CP:
RC:

Ok, let's back up. You did open the car door right?
Yea. I opened the car door.

CP:
RC:

And you did stab him in the leg, right?
I guess I did.

CP:
RC:

Ok, alright. When you stabbed him in the leg did you intend to kill him?
No.

CP:
RC:

What was your intent when you stabbed him in the leg?
What was my intent? I honest, I hate this kind of thing

CP:
RC:

I know you're scared to death, you're scared to death. Your options are...
I was scared too when all that shit happened you know. I didn't know what
Was going on what was happening I was just trying to fight my way out so
I could go.

CP:

Ok, listen to me ok, let's focus here on your intent. You open the door
And stabbed him in the leg. When you stabbed him in the leg did you intend
To kill him?
No.

RC:
CP:
RC:
CP:

No, ok. What did you, what was your intent when you stabbed him in the leg, ok,
and your options are - 1 wanted to hurt him, I wanted to teach him a lesson, I
Wanted to maim him - what were you thinking when you stabbed him in the leg?
Just self defense, you know, I just trying to get out of there, just, I was scared.
Ok, now listen, I want you to back up and think about this. You are going to tell
A jury that you opened a car door, a guy sitting in his car with the door shut, and
You open the door and you stab him in the leg as you were defending yourself?
That's not going to fly, Raul, ok? We really don't want to screw you here, Raul,
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RC:
CP:

Really we don't, ok?
That's what's happening though, I don't...

RC:

Your options are (tape ends) that - 1 really didn't intend for him to die,
I wanted to impress his girlfriend - you tell me, what was your intention
When you stabbed him in the leg?
Save myself, because I didn't know who was who or what was what
I'm saying and that's kind of, I don't know you know, I'm not trying to
bullshit you, you guys got me for this, but honestly I don't remember
having the knife. All I remember is fighting.

CP:
RC:

Were you drunk?
A little bit.

CP:
RC:

Ok, were you like out of control?
Yea, I was real scared. I was scared for my life. With all that shit that
Was going on inside the house and then outside, I didn't know who was
There. It was dark, I don't know what the hell was going on.

CP:

What happened, wait a minute let me write some things down. Alright, so
You remember you did open the car door when he's sitting in his car,
I remember that yes.

RC:
CP:
RC:

Ok, and then do you remember hitting him?
Yea, I hit him in the face and then he started swinging back at me and then
We were fighting and we turned around and he kicked me in my face, he
Kicked me in my face twice and he got out and we started fighting again and
I backed up because someone pulled me, someone pulled me and I backed up
And then the guy just drove off. Everybody started driving out.

CP:
RC:

Ok, so you open the door, punch him in the face, he hits you back...
Yea, we started scuffling like that...

CP:
RC:

And he kicks you while he's in the driver's seat?
Yea, he turned around like that and he kicked me right in my face. And then
I grabbed his foot and he kicked me with his other foot and I stumbled back
And started swinging with him again and then somebody just pulled me back
And I turned around and then I turned back around and all the cars are driving
Off.

CP:

So, were you guys like, after he kicked you in the face did he like get out of
The car and you guys were like duking it out again on the front lawn?
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RC:

No, not on the front lawn, in the street.

CP:
RC:

In the street?
Yea, we were in the street.

CP:
RC:

How did you guys separate?
Someone pulled me back like that and I was seeing who it was, I didn't know
Who it was. I was going to turn around and just start fighting again and then
They pulled me back and it was some other dude with short hair and then I
Turned back around and all the cars started driving off. And then we jumped
In our car and we all drove off too.

CP:
RC:

Ok. You do not remember having a knife in your hand?
Honestly I don't. And I know that's going to fuck me but honestly I really
Don't remember it.

CP:
RC:

Do you remember punching him in the leg with your fist?
I was just punching, I didn't see where every punch was going. I just remember
swinging it with him.

CP:

Well, you know you're actually a good guy and what we've told you here is
really true. We don't want to see you go to prison for the rest of your life over
this ok? I guess you've been as truthful with us as you can and we appreciate
it. Answer a question for me. Maybe I misunderstand this whole incident.
There is a party with a lot of people. The Tongans break in, there's one hell of
a big fight, but then the Tongans all run out and they get in a car and they flee.
They left. So why was there still a fight going on after all the Tongans left?
Well, There wasn't. We went outside and there was still fighting There was
someone that was inside the house that went out there because I remember even
The guy that lived there was out there at the corner.

RC:

CP:

Well, what's been explained to me is that the Tongans ran right out to their
car and took off and so I was confused on why there was still a fight going on
in the front yard. So what you are saying is that they didn't run right to their
car, that the Tongans were still fighting in the front yard. Is that what you are
saying?
RC: Yea, there was still some out there like there was still a whole bunch of them
left out there. Like a whole bunch of people went out there. There was more
than like five or six of them and I was out there too because I was like right
from
where the kitchen was I went to like, there was the kitchen and then I
went out and just started seeing everybody, there was still a bunch of people in
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front

of the door fighting, people on the ground and everything and then I seen
my brother's shirt and I seen some guy hitting him so I just ran up and stalled
hitting the guy and then everybody was just like pushed out there and I got
pushed out there with those guys and then I was still fighting one more. And
I heard the windows breaking and stuff and then everybody just started running
and then there was car's that was leaving and just a whole bunch of shit. And
then someone says something and I turned around and I didn't know if it was
them or not and I walked, and then I got hit and figured it was probably one
of them and some other people that was out there with me and I just started
fighting with them.

CP:
RC:

Ok, this guy in this car leaving with the girls, why didn't you just let him go?
Well that was the girls that we went with left right before that and then we was
calling some other girls, I was trying to call for some other girls to kick it with
because we were planning on having sex with those girls, you know what I'm
saying, we was at a party, drinking a little bit, trying to have fun. And then they
left and then I just tried to hit some more girls up and all that and then after that
the people, those Samoans or Islanders came and then all that shit happened.

CP:

Yea, but my question is, this guy is sitting in his car with these girls and trying
to get the hell out of there. Obviously you guys had already fought in the front
lawn but why go back and open his car door and screw with him again?
I was walking out to the street to get to my car. Because I'm on probation you
know what I'm saying and being in that kind of situation it's a violation. And
I tried to get up out of there before all of it, all that shit happened. And when I
realized ray little brother wasn't out there I went up to the door and then we
left, and then all that shit happened and then we left. Got in a fight with another
guy there. Just smashed out.

RC:

CP:
VS:

RC:

VS:
RC:

Do you have any questions?
I do. I guess maybe I'm confused, but you got into a fight with this guy who's
in his car, alright, with these girls. You go out, open the car door and you guiys
start fighting again. You've already essentially told us that you stabbed the guy
but you weren't sure why, you weren't sure where, and now you've kind of
backed off from that. I guess I'm a little confused.
Well he was over there saying that people seen me stab him. I don't remember
stabbing him. But I'm not going to say this stuff on tape.
But you remember having a knife.. .how about if I turn the tape off, you going to
talk to me decently then? You don't have to lie to me?
I'm not going to lie.
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(Tape ends - starts again)
VS:

RC:
VS:

RC:

We know what happened. We know that there was an altercation. We know
That you opened up the car door. We know that you ultimately stabbed him
In the, while he was sitting in the car. What we don't know is what was going
through your mind? Were you " I'm going to kill this mother fucker" or "take
that. " That's a big difference. On the spectrum of things "Take that" is so
much further away from "I'm going to kill this mother fucker".
I understand.
And what, you ended up stabbing him? That leans more towards this end of
the thing but where you are not even willing to meet us anywhere and tell us
your side of the story, that puts us back up here automatically because
I know

VS:
RC:

I mean you're not helping yourself out at all.
I know. And there's witnesses that seen me stab him? I, there's just so
much commotion you know what I'm saying. I don't remember everything.

VS:

Well, your own brother can't keep his mouth shut, man. That's why I was gone
so long, but we got to a spot where I have to let him come in and let him finish it
up because this is his case. And I want him to hear. I don't want to have to write
The report. Do you see what I'm saying?
Well, yea, and if my brother's telling on me then he's saving his own skin, but
the people...

RC:

VS:

He's not telling on you, he's telling us the truth, the way it happened. And so
you know when he goes up, the judge is going to say "ok, this guy he's a man,
He's alright, he's telling us what happened, he ain't trying to hide behind nothing.
This is the way he said it happened, I think he's being honest with us" , he's more
on this end of the spectrum. He's not way up here. He didn't think you were
going to kill him either, man. He thought you were just going to stab him or
threaten him and it ended up ultimately we know that you stabbed him and
we don't think you meant to kill him. If we thought that you meant to kill him
we wouldn't even be here having this discussion. You would already be in
the bucket. You know. If we thought, if you had stabbed him in the chest or
the throat or something like that, we wouldn't even be here. We wouldn't be
wasting our time. Because there's no doubt at all what the intent was there.
What we are trying to do here, man, is to get your intent. Find out what was
going through your mind, what you actually meant to do because if we know
What you actually meant to do, it keeps you down here man, in our opinion.
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We don't think it was intentional, do you see what I am saying? So you open
The car door, your brother hands you this knife, then what happens?

RC:

Well, he, it didn't go like that. He hit me, opened the car door, I went in there
and I hit him in his face, you know what I'm saying?

VS:
RC:

Sure
He started swinging back at me. We started swinging so we were over there
fighting. That's honestly all that I can remember. You could say I blacked
out or theie's just some stuff that I can't remem...

VS:
CP:

You can remember the minor things like windows breaking and...
How man times he kicked you in the face...

VS:

how many times he kicked you in the face, but you can't remember taking a knife
from your brother and just stabbing him in the leg? Maybe to get him off of you?
maybe to get him to quit kicking you or something?
Maybe at that point I just wigged out you know probably just got pissed off and
grabbed it. Honestly I don't remember and I know this is fucking me right now
you know what I am saying but I am being truthful as hell.

RC:

VS:
RC:
VS:

RC:

How much time are we gonna waste on this guy? You know, you are not a stupid
guy
I'm not so why am I going to sit here, everybody's seen me do it, why am I going
To sit here and say I didn't do it, you know what I'm saying?
Right, but you're not stupid, and you know we're not stupid right? And you
know that we know what happened. You know that we have witnesses that saw
and you know that we have people as well that know what happened. So
everybody really knows what happened. The only thing we don't know, man
is why? What was your intent? What were you trying to do? Were you just
trying to get him to quit kicking you in the chest, in the chin or were you trying to
kill him?
No, I was just trying to get out of there. No I wasn't trying to kill nobody. I'm
not like that. Even in the house you know what I'm saying? I didn't have no
knife or nothing so I was just fighting.

VS:
RC:

So you're still saying that you didn't have a knife in the car?
I guess I did have a knife

VS:
RC:

You guess? I mean that's kind of...
I don't remember, I mean I just, we were just fighting, there was a whole bunch of
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commotion going, you know what I am saying? If I had a knife, you know,
if I stabbed him, It wasn't intent. You know what I am saying? I didn't mean for
nobody dying, I didn't mean to stab nobody. If I did stab people you know, I'm
not that kind of a person. I would like to fight more.

VS:
RC:

Do you realize that car was full of people, just full of people sitting right there
about as close to you and me as they were to you? Probably closer?
I know there was people in the car.

VS:
RC:

It makes for some pretty damn good witnesses,you know that?
I know and that's why I don't want to kind of contradict my story, you know,
or have kind of contradict stories you know because ...

VS:

I don't want you to contradict a story, I just want you to tell us what happened
with the knife you know?
You've already admitted you did it, why do you have such a hard time saying
it, why do you have such a hard time?
I don't remember a knife in my hand. I don't honestly. And I know this is
fucking me and I know that there is people that seen me with the
knife. I don't honestly remember having the knife.

CP:
RC:

VS:
CP:

Stop worrying about people fucking you and start worrying about how you can
mitigate your circumstances a little bit. How you can alleviate some of your
Mitigating circumstances...

VS:
CP:
RC:

Undermine some of your sentencing
This is really important to your future, I mean look at me ok?
I know, I got a four year old son and then I got another one on the way,
I know.

CP:

Look at my face, ok , if you are not truthful with us you're going to be as old as
me before you get out of prison?
I know.

RC:
CP:
RC:
CP:
RC:

Ok, prison time for murder vs. prison time for manslaughter. There's a hell of a
big difference there.
I know, and that's why I want the least time.
But we want you to be honest you know?
I'm not like that, I'm more of a fighter you know. See my finger is
messed up from fighting? I've got scars there from fighting. I love the fight.
I'm not a person to stab somebody or shoot somebody. I'm a man you know
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and that's the way I like to go it. Knuckle up. And if I had a knife you know
I'm sony for having the knife and if I stabbed him I'm sorry for it.
It wasn't intent.
CP:
RC:

Well there's no "if I had a knife" you did have a knife.
I don't remember a knife.

CP:
RC:

We know you had a knife. Come on, you're nearly there for Christ sakes.
And I'm trying to get the best way out of this that I can you know.

CP:
RC:

Ok, stop, you're nearly there. You had a knife right?
I had a knife.

CP:
RC:

There you go. And you stabbed him in the leg, didn't you?
I stabbed Mm in the leg.

CP:
RC:

Alright, and why did you do that?
Probably to get him out of there so he'd stop hitting me, stop getting the
Best of me, you know what I'm saying?

CP
RC:

Ok. And where was he sitting when you stabbed him with the knife?
hi his car.

CP:
RC:

Ok, now why is that so hard to say?
It ain't.

CP:

Ok. Well, you've admitted to the whole thing ok? So, what were you
thinking when you stabbed him?
Just trying to get out of there
can't even talk.... Get out of there with the
least harm done to me you know what I'm saying just try to get up out of
there as safe as possible.

RC:

CP:

RC:

I don't think that's quite true. I think we are really near the truth but I think
that you are having a hard time saying it. You were just going to get him back.
It was just to get back for him whooping you on the front lawn.
Well, I didn't fight no one. I fought, I was fighting some Tongan and like
Tan or whites on the front lawn. And then we went out to the street. We
Were all fighting and then we all went out. There was some people out there.
We all went out there. There was the Samoans because they were all by the
Door and then there was the people that was inside the house with us. We
started a fighting and it was like the fight was just like from the kitchen to the
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front room, it was all just right there. And then like people just started going
Out there and one of, we started fighting and it was I remember, I even
remember getting hit in the back of the head with someone in blue, he was
wearing blue. Because I went out, I was closer to the door, and I like to
fight, you know what I'm saying, so I was just trying to get out of there too
because I know how those PVCC's are, you know what I am saying? they are
like to shoot. You know what I'm saying? And I'm trying to get the hell
out of there too because I don't want to get shot and everything. And I don't
even know what the hell the whole fight started over. You know what I'm
saying, there's people that just walked in and then I seen...

CP:

RC:

Ok, we don't want to go over that we know all of that. We're just focusing
on events in the front yard ok? Now, I thought you said that the guy that
was sitting in the car, right? The guy that you stabbed in the leg, right? I
thought you said that you fought with him in the front yard before he got in
his car?
No. I got in a fight with him right next to his car when everybody was leaving.
People were leaving and I was walking in the street, I was walking in the street
and he said something and I was like "what?"

CP:
RC:

Stop. Was he sitting in his car when he said that something?
Yea.

CP:

So he was in the car with these girls and then he said something to you and
then he said something to you and then you walked over to the car?
No, I was already in the street from the fight you know People started scattering
and I was out in the street, just like tripping, like what the fuck just happened?
And then I was walking in the street, on the side of the street, like that in the
Street because there was cars that was trying to drive off. There was a whole
bunch of cars, there was like two or three that was leaving

RC:

CP:
RC:

Kind of like a logjam?
Yea it was right there and that's where it happened, I never said I fought this guy
in the grass. I fought him in the street.

CP:
RC:

So he's sitting in his car and you're on foot and you exchange words?
Yea.

CP:
RC:

And then you walk over and open the door and start fighting?
No, I was on the driver's side, the driver's side and that's when he said something
and then he hit me and so I opened the door and started hitting him back.
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CP:
RC:

Did he start hitting you through the window or something?
Yes.

CP:
RC:

What did he hit you with?
His fist.

CP:

So then you opened the door and stabbed him, not meaning to kill him but
stabbed him? Not meanign to kill him.
Yea. I'm not a murderer you know I like to fight.

RC:
CP:
RC:

What the hell you doing with a knife? What the hell were you doing?
There was just so much commotion and confrontation going on I was just
trying to get out of there safe.

CP:
RC:

Were you in his way? I mean were you like standing in front of his car so
he couldn't turn and leave?
Uh huh.

CP:
RC:

Then why would he exchange words with you?
I don't know. I don't know. There was just so much shit going on.

VS:
RC:

What did he say to you?
He said like "who the fuck are you?" or "what the fuck do you want?" or
some shit like that. And I was like "what?"

CP:
RC:

So he called you on or something?
Yea, he said something and I was like "what" as I was walking by and I looked
in at him and he hit me.

CP:
RC:

That would make me angry too. So he said "who the fuck are you"?
Yea he said "who the fuck are you" or "what the fuck you want? Some shit
like that.

VS:
RC:

Just popping off?
Yea, just popping off at the mouth you know and then when I got up closer to him
I was saying "well who the fuck are you" and everybody's adrenalin pumping
seeing as we just got in a big old scuffle and so I was like what the fuck and then
I got hit and so I just started hitting him back.

CP:

So he hit you through his open drivers window?
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VS:

That's kind of chicken shit isn't it? Wouldn't even get out of the car.

RC:

It was kind of chicken shit for me to stab him too. It wasn't something
I intended or nothing.

CP:

Ok? here's something else. I was told by witness, one of the many witnesses,
That he was sitting in his car in the driveway getting ready to leave and you
Just walked over to his car, took the knife from your brother, opened the door,
stabbed him in the leg. Like that. No words exchanged, no fighting between
you. Just opened the door and bang like that. Is that true or not?
No, that's not true, the cars were all like trying to go out to that main street
that was right there. Like I remember coming from 27th south and
then turned where the Maverick was and we went up a little and then the
street went up like this and then it went around like that. The cars were all
trying to drive out. There wasn't nobody in the driveway, I didn't see anybody
in the driveway. I wasn't even in the driveway. I went from the grass into the
street. And then all that fighting happened and then I went back

RC:

CP:
RC:

Ok, let me get this again. This guy he definitely kicked you in the face and
He fought with you before you stabbed him?
Yea.

CP:

Alright, that's all I have.

That will end the interview. The time now is 15:03
CP:
RC:

CP:
RC:

I'm back on tape at 15:03. Did you know it was Daniel Johnson when you
stabbed him?
I didn't know who he was but after I heard you know that shit happened at
that party and read and stuff in the newspaper and I seen his name I didn't know.
At the time you were fighting with him, at the time of the confrontation, who
did you think it was?
I didn't know who it was.

CP:
RC:

Did you think he was a Tongan or with the Tongans?
I didn't know who he was or what he was. He just said something and I
looked, got hit and just started fighting again.

CP:

Ok, so it had nothing to do with like a conflict over girlfriends, drugs,
drug debts, nothing like that?
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RC:

Nothing like that.

CP:
RC:

He was just a guy that mouthed off to you?
And we just started fighting and I didn't know if he was one of the Tongans
or with the Tongans or not. I just didn't recognize him or nothing. So I was
like "who the fuck are you?"

CP:

Ok, I think actually that's going to make it a lot easier for everybody to take.
If you know what I mean?
Not only that, when I started reading the stuff in the newspapers I know who
his family is, you know I know who his Dad is, his uncles, you know what
I'm saying? And my mom and his Dad and the Johnson family are real good
friends. There's even one of my cousins that, well one of my cousin's is a
Johnson. I'm not going to try to kill an old friend of the family, you know
what I'm saying? I'm not that type of person.

RC:

CP:
RC:

So you really didn't know who it was?
I didn't know who it was.

CP:

Alright, that will end the interview 15:04 is the time.
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